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Congressional Preemption of Mortgage
Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of the
Garn-St. Germain Actt
By GRANT S. NELSON*
and DALE A. WHITMAN**

The law of real property usually develops in an evolutionary fashion. Change is often measured in terms of decades and centuries rather
than in months and years. Yet economic turmoil can accelerate this
process. Just as the Great Depression of the 1930s spurred the enactment of mortgage moratoria and antideficiency legislation,' so too has
the inflationary economic climate of the 1970s and early 1980s engendered new mortgage law.
The major focus of this latter period has been on the due-on-sale
clause, a mortgage provision that affords the mortgagee the right to
accelerate the mortgage debt and to foreclose if the mortgaged real estate is transferred without the mortgagee's consent. 2 While the clause is
sometimes used to protect mortgagees against transfers that endanger
mortgage security or increase the risk of default, its major purpose is to
enable mortgagees to recall lower-than-market interest rate loans during periods of rising interest rates. 3 Because its use in this context pits
lenders against borrowers and real estate buyers, the clause has become
t © Copyright 1983 Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman.
* Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A.,
1960; J.D., 1963, University of Minnesota.
** Dean and R. B. Price Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.E.S.,
1963, Brigham Young University; LL.B., 1966, Duke University.
1. See G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 333 (2d ed. 1970).
2. A typical due-on-sale clause provides: "If all or any part of the Property or an
interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent,
...
Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this mortgage to be
due and payable." Federal National Mortgage Association/Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Mortgage, Clause 17 (one to four family) [hereinafter cited as FNMA/FHLMC
Mortgage].
3.

See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.21

(1979) (citing Volkmer, The Application ofRestraintson Alienation Doctrine to Real Property
Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747, 769 (1973)) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE, NELSON
& WHITMAN]. The clause usually does not mention interest rate increases per se, but the
lender will frequently use the threat of acceleration as leverage to exact from the transferee
an agreement to pay a higher interest rate.
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a major economic, political, and legal issue. It has been confronted

and evaluated by most state supreme courts, 4 many legislatures,5 cer-7
6
tain federal regulatory agencies, the United States Supreme Court,
8
and ultimately Congress. It has also been the subject of a great deal of
scholarly commentary. 9
Given recent economic conditions, this close scrutiny is hardly surprising. Due to high interest rates and the limited availability of home
financing, large numbers of potential home buyers have been excluded

from the housing market.' 0 For many purchasers, the assumption of an
existing lower-than-market interest mortgage has represented one of
the few practical financing alternatives. The financial climate has also
made it much more difficult for owners to sell. Many sellers have been
forced either to reduce significantly the price of their properties to en4. See infra text accompanying notes 36-61.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 73-80.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 81-88.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 89-100.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
9. See Ashley, Use of "Due-On" Clauses to Gain CollateralBenets: A Common Sense
Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590 (1975); Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real
EstateFinancingin Californiain Times ofFluctuatingInterest Rates-LegalIssues andAlternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 267 (1972); Hetland, RealProperty andReal PropertySecurity: The
Well-Being of the Law, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 151 (1965); Maxwell, The Due-On-Sale Clause:
Restraints on Alienation andAdhesion Theory in California, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 197 (1982);
Segreti, The Borrower as Servant of the Lender- Enforcement of Mortgage Due-on-Sale
Clauses, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 779 (1982); Volkmer, The Application ofthe Restraintson Alienation Doctrineto RealPropertySecurity Interests, 58 IoWA L. REv. 747 (1973); Comment, The
Futureofthe Due-On-Sale Clause in Alabama, 33 ALA. L. REv. 83 (1981); Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogueand Critique on the Role ofEquity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day
"Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV. 485 (1973); Comment, Applying the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses: ControllingTheir Misuse in Real Property Secured Transactions, 9 CAL.
W.L. REv. 514 (1973); Comment, Beyond Tucker v. Lassen: The Future of the Due-on-Sale
Clause in Calfornia, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1975); Comment, South Dakota's Approach to
the Due-on-Sale Clause: An Analysis o/Automatic Enforcement, 27 S.D.L. REV. 261 (1982);
Comment, JudicialTreatmentof the Due-on-Sale Clause: The CaseforAdopting Standardsof
Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, JudicialTreatment]; Note, Property--The Demise of the Due-on-Sale Clause, 64
CALIF. L. REv. 573 (1976); Note, Mortgages-Due-on-SaleClause: Restrainton AlienationEnforceability, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 493 (1978); Note, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance Clauses in Calffornia, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 306 (1974); Note, Deeds of Trust-RestraintsAgainst Alienation-Due-on Clauseis an UnreasonableRestrainton Alienation Absent a
Showing of Protectionof Mortgagee's Legitimate Interests, 47 Miss. L.J. 331 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, UnreasonableRestraint];Note, Mortgages-UseofDue on Sale Clauseby
a Lender is Not a Restraint onAlienationin North Carolina,55 N.C.L. REv. 310 (1977); Note,
The Due-on-Sale Clause: Enforcement Standards, 60 NEB. L. REv. 594 (1981); Note, Due-onSale Clauses: SeparatingSocial Interests From Individual Interests, 35 VAND. L. REv. 357
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, SeparatingInterests].
10. See, e.g., The Great Housing Collapse, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1982, at 61-62.
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able buyers to qualify for institutional high-interest financing, or to suffer an effective price reduction by financing part of the purchase price
themselves at lower-than-market interest rates. Thus, for those sellers
with lower-than-market interest rate mortgages on their properties, assumability of the mortgage may be the key to obtaining a higher asking
price for the property. 1
On the other hand, the economic stake of institutional lenders in
upholding due-on-sale clauses is also great. During the past several
years many institutional lenders, especially savings and loan associations, have experienced severe economic difficulty. Because they hold
portfolios that include large numbers of fixed rate, lower-yielding
mortgage loans, they have been hard pressed to pay the higher shortterm rates demanded by depositors. 12 Many savings and loan associations and similar institutions have failed, and others remain in precarious financial positions.13 Because the due-on-sale clause provides one
means of eliminating lower-interest mortgage loans from institutional
portfolios, and does so without resort to expensive federal "bailout" or
other subsidy schemes, its enforceability has been deemed important
14
for the economic health of the thrift industry.
11. See Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981), where
the court suggested that real estate that would sell for $100,000, assuming the buyer obtained
new 30-year, fixed rate first mortgage financing at 15% per annum, would sell for $115,000 if
the buyer were able to assume an existing $50,000 fixed rate mortgage at 10% with a remaining term of 27 years. Id. at 915 n.8. For further consideration of the seller's situation, see
Note, SeparatingInterests, supra note 9, at 376. See also Sirmans, Sirmans & Smith, The
Effect of Assumption Financingon ResidentialProperty Values, 16 FED. HOME LOAN BANK
BOARD J., Aug. 1983, at 22 (suggesting that home sellers capture only about 35% of the value
of their assumable below-market-rate loans).
12. This problem has been with the thrift industry at least since the first major post-war
interest rate upswing in 1966. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE AssocIATION PUBLIC MEETING ON CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE FoRMs 203-04 (Comm. Print 1971)
(statement of the Executive Vice President of the California Savings and Loan League); see
also infra notes 13-14.
13. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which bears the responsibility for salvaging or liquidating failed savings and loan associations carrying deposit insurance, placed 14 associations in receivership during 1982. All but one of these insolvencies
were resolved by mergers with other associations (the remaining one was liquidated). In all,
there were 210 "supervisory mergers" of financially troubled associations during 1982. Of
those, 44 required financial assistance from the FSLIC to compensate for the weakness of
one of the merger partners. These statistics are higher than for any previous year. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board Annual Report 1982, 16 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J.,
Apr. 1983, at 13-20.
14. "LTlhe [savings and loan associations'] practice of borrowing short and lending
long, . . combined with rising interest rates, has increased the cost of funds to these institutions and reduced their income. Exercising due-on-sale clauses enables savings and loan
associations to alleviate this problem by replacing long-term, low yield loans with loans at
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Other policy arguments have been utilized to buttress due-on-sale
enforceability. Several years ago we summarized them as follows.
First, one should focus on the reasonable expectations of the mortgagor
at the time a mortgage loan is first made. Usually, at least in the residential setting, the borrower is concerned most with his immediate cost,
i e. , the interest rate and how much his monthly payment is going to be.
Normally, he will not be concerned with his mortgage as a method for
facilitating a future sale of his home. In other words, perhaps it is simply unwise to conceive of a method utilized to acquire a home as also a
device to facilitate its sale. Second, the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses tends to reduce the discrimination that otherwise exists in favor
of those buyers who are fortunate enough to find a low interest loan to
assume against those who are forced to obtain new mortgage financing.
Indeed, because existing low interest loans have been paid down to
some extent, and because of inflation in the value of real estate, those
who are able to assume an existing loan generally will be those who can
come up with a significant amount of cash, whereas those who are not
so fortunate in this regard will be forced to obtain new financing at
higher market interest rates. Thus, to the extent that due-on-sale
clauses are not enforced, an inordinate interest rate advantage may be
afforded to higher net worth buyers over those who are less fortunate.' 5
Congress, responding to the financial distress of many institutional
lenders' 6 after a decade of judicial, legislative, and regulatory turmoil
at both the state and federal levels, has attempted to resolve the dueon-sale controversy by enacting section 341 of the Gan-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Act).' 7 The Act generally favors
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. This Article explores the provisions, scope, and impact of the Act in substantial detail.
We first describe the several major types of mortgagor transfer restrictions, and the judicial and legislative responses to these restrictions
the prevailing interest rates and thereby to avoid increasing interest rates across the board."
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 168 (1982).
15. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 5.23. See also Cassidy, Monte
Carlo Simulation Estimatesof the Expected Value of the Due-on-Sale Clause in Home Mortgages, 2 HousiNG FIN. REV. 33 (1983), estimating that prohibition of due-on-sale enforcement would result in mortgage interest rates 0.3% to 0.8% higher than without the
prohibition.
16. See The Depository Institutions Amendments of 1982 Hearings on . 2879, H.R.
4603, and HR. 6267 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation
and Insurance ofthe House Comm. on Banking, Finance and UrbanAffairs, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982) (containing the statements of representatives of savings and loan associations
and banks); see also supra notes 13-14.
17. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1505 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982)).
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before the Act. Second, we analyze the effect and coverage of the important provisions of the Act and its attendant regulation. The complex exceptions to the application of the Act known as "window
periods" are then considered. These window periods were created by
Congress in an attempt to soften the impact of the Act on states that
previously restricted due-on-sale enforcement, and are based on preexisting state law. We examine the difficult standards for identifying such
window periods and suggest alternative approaches, using California
and Arizona as models. We then describe the Act's impact on certain
federally-chartered lenders, prepayment penalties, the mortgagor's
duty to respond, and release of the original mortgagor. Finally, we
discuss the problem of concealment of transfers under the Act.
Throughout, we evaluate the extent to which the Act and Regulations
achieve sound public policy goals. We conclude that while the intent
of the Act and the resulting national uniformity should be applauded,
poor drafting has resulted in needless complexity and uncertainty.

The Other Types of Mortgage Transfer Restrictions
Due-on-Encumbrance Restrictions
Mortgages may restrict mortgagor transfers by means other than a
due-on-sale clause. 18 For example, a mortgage may contain a clause
authorizing the mortgagee to accelerate the debt if the mortgagor "further encumbers" the mortgaged real estate. Such language is usually
referred to as a "due-on-encumbrance" provision. 19 While due-on-en20
cumbrance language is often included as part of a due-on-sale clause,
it is not uncommon for a mortgage to contain a separate due-on-encumbrance clause. 2 ' Unlike the due-on- sale situation, in which the
mortgagee's desire to increase the interest rate predominates, due-on18. For an unusual illustration, see Investor Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ganz, 174 N.J.
Super. 356, 361, 416 A.2d 918, 921-22 (1980) (upholding a clause giving the mortgagee the
right to accelerate if the property ceased to be owner-occupied).
19. See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 5.21; Volkmer, supra note 9, at
769.
20. For an example of this approach, consider the following clause: "Should trustor
(mortgagor) sell, convey, transfer, dispose of, orfurtherencumber said property, or any part
thereof, or any interest therein, or agree so to do, without the written consent of the Beneficiary (mortgagee) being first obtained, then Beneficiary shall have the right at his option, to
declare all sums secured hereby forthwith due and payable." Comment, JudicialTreatment,
supra note 9, at 1110 n.5 (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., Chilivis v. Tumlin Woods Realty Ass'n, Inc., 250 Ga. 179, 179, 297 S.E.2d
4, 4 (1982) ("If Grantor further encumbers the premises by any mortgages, loans or security
deeds securing loans made to Grantor without notice to and prior written permission from
Grantee (mortgagee), such will constitute an event of default.").
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encumbrance language is utilized mainly to protect against impairment
of mortgage security by a debtor who incurs a junior mortgage debt
and thus reduces his or her economic stake in the mortgaged real estate. 22 However, the due-on-encumbrance clause probably is used
23
much less frequently than its due-on-sale counterpart.
Increased-Interest-on-Transfer Clauses
Another provision closely related to the due-on-sale clause authorizes the mortgagee to increase or adjust the mortgage interest rate in
the event of a transfer by the mortgagor. We refer to this as an "increased-interest-on transfer" clause.24 This type of clause fulfills the
same economic function as the due-on-sale clause in that it enables the

mortgagee to use a transfer by the mortgagor as the basis for increasing
the interest yield on the mortgage. However, unlike a due-on-sale
clause, it does not confer on the mortgagee an absolute right to accelerate the mortgage debt upon a transfer; hence it gives no direct protec-

tion against transfer to an uncreditworthy buyer. Only if the transferee
fails to pay the increased mortgage payments will there be grounds for
declaration of a default and acceleration of the debt.
Installment Land Contract Prohibitions on Transfer

Transfer restrictions may also appear in installment land contracts,
25
which are probably the most commonly used mortgage substitute.
Known in many areas of the country as a "contract for deed" or "long
term land contract," the installment land contract performs the same

economic function as a purchase-money mortgage: it provides seller
22. See Volkmer, supra note 9, at 769-70.
23. The mortgage form specified for use by lenders who sell mortgages to the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) on the secondary market specifically excludes any restriction on further encumbrances: "If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred
by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or
encumbrance subordinate to this Mortgage ... Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all
the sums secured by this mortgage to be due and payable." FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage,
supra note 2, Clause 17 (one to four family).
24. A recent example of an "increased interest on transfer clause" provides: "the Mortgagees hereby agree that the Mortgagors may assign this Purchase Money Mortgage, but the
rate of interest, at the time of assignment, shall be adjusted upward to correspond with the
prevailing interest rate of banks, savings and loan associations, and other mortgage lenders
in the community." O'Connell v. Dockendorff, 415 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. App. 1982). See also
Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 402, 545 P.2d 546, 547
(1976).
25. See Randall v. Riel, 465 A.2d 505, 507 (N.H. 1983) (citing Nelson & Whitman, The
Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 541).

November 1983]

DUE-ON-SALE PREEMPTION

financing of all or part of the unpaid real estate purchase price.26 Vendors often find the installment land contract attractive because of its
forfeiture clause-language specifying that "time is of the essence" and
that upon vendee default in payment or other contract obligations the
vendor has the option to terminate the contract, retake possession of
27
the premises, and retain all prior payments as liquidated damages.
However, in many jurisdictions legislatures and courts have placed restrictions on the forfeiture remedy, especially when the vendee has acquired substantial equity in the property.2 8 Other jurisdictions have
gone so far as to treat the installment land contract as a mortgage, thus
affording the vendee the traditional substantive and procedural rights
of a mortgagor, including the right to a public sale after a judicial fore29
closure proceeding.
Installment land contracts frequently include a provision that prohibits assignment by the vendee without the vendor's permission.3 0 Violation of such a provision constitutes a default and might result in
vendor termination of the contract and loss of the purchaser's equity.
In this respect the provision differs from a due-on-sale clause, under
which an unapproved transfer will at most trigger an acceleration of
the mortgage debt and, if the accelerated debt is unpaid, a public fore31
closure sale of the mortgaged real estate.
Events Triggering Acceleration
A common question is what kind of event will trigger acceleration
of a debt under a due-on-sale or other transfer restriction clause.
While some early clauses used a "sale" alone as the triggering event,
most of the recent forms employ broader language, often modeled after
the mortgage form specified for use by lenders who sell mortgages to
26.

Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977

B.Y.U. L. REV. 541, 541.

27. Id at 542. See also Jenkins v. Wise, 58 Hawaii 592, 596, 574 P.2d 1337, 1341
(1978); Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Comment, Forefeiture:
The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALBANY L. REV. 71, 72 (1977).
28. See, e.g., ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33, 741-742 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 656.1-.6 (West 1950 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West 1947 & Supp.
1982). See also OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, §§ 3.27-.28.
29. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973); Sebastian v.
Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1981); Bean v. Walker, 95 A.D.2d 70, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § I la (West Supp. 1976).
30.

See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 5.26; see also Volkmer, supra

note 9, at 753 n.34.
3 1. In the context of the traditional restraint-on-alienation analysis considered later in
this article, see infra text accompanying notes 36-48, the "no-transfer" provision probably
represents a forfeiture type of direct restraint.
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the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). This language refers to
a transfer of any part of the property or any interest in it.32 Under such
language, in principle at least, even a short-term lease 33 or a grant of an
easement or other limited interest in the land would suffice to trigger
the lender's right to accelerate.

Perhaps the most significant question is whether a sale by installment land contract permits acceleration. The answer depends on the
exact wording of the clause in question,34 but under broad language
like that of the FNMA/FHLMC clause the courts have nearly uni35
formly permitted acceleration.

32. See supra note 2 for the text of the due-on-sale clause found in the
FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage.
33. But see FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage, supra note 2 (expressly exempting leases for
less than three years which include no option to purchase).
34. In Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974), for example, a sale by installment contract under a clause as broad as that
of the FNMA/FHLMC was held not to trigger acceleration. Id. at 638-39, 526 P.2d at 1174,
116 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40. The court felt enforcing the clause would constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation where the vendor retained legal title under the contract and the
vendor's legitimate interest was not threatened. Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr.
at 639. This distinction between installment and "outright" sales was subsequently discarded by the California Supreme Court in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943,
950, 582 P.2d 970, 974, 148 Cal. Reptr. 379, 383 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes
217-19; see also Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Columbia Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Colo.
-,
-, 661 P.2d 257, 260 (1983) (rejecting any distinction between installment and "outright" sales on policy grounds). It is doubtful that today any court would follow the
distinction.
35. See Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Columbia Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Colo. -,
661 P.2d 257, 259-60 (1983); Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glabn, 144 N.J.
Super. 48, 50, 55, 364 A.2d 558, 563 (1976); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Given by
Bill M. Taylor, 60 N.C. App. 134, 135, 298 S.E.2d 163, 165-66 (1982); Smith v. Frontier Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 649 P.2d 536, 538 (Okla. 1982); Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., 223 Va.
131, 140, 286 S.E.2d 215, 216-17, 220 (1982); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin
Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 101, 110,205 N.W.2d 762,769 (1973). Butsee Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Grieme, 112 IlM.App. 3d 1014, 1019, 446 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1983) (entering
into agreement for deed held insufficient to trigger clause allowing lender to accelerate upon
"change of ownership").
Most courts permitting acceleration rely on the equitable conversion doctrine, which
holds that a buyer of real estate has "equitable title" as soon as the contract is entered into.
See generally 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 667 (1960); Davis, The Origin of the Doctrine of
Equitable Conversion by Contract, 25 Ky. L.J. 58 (1936).
The Washington courts, which generally do not follow the doctrine of equitable conversion, have nonetheless concluded that a contract sale will trigger a due-on-sale clause. See
Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 439, 553 P.2d 1090,
1091 (1976); Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 654, 604 P.2d 504, 506 (1979); see also
Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 919-20 (4th Cir. 1981) (seller placed
land in an inter vivos trust and then transferred beneficial ownership of the trust; held,
FNMA/FHLMC due-on-sale clause was triggered). But see Wachta v. First Fed. Say. &
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Judicial Responses to Mortgagor Transfer Restrictions Before
the Act
Due-on-Sale Clauses
Due-on-sale clauses have come under judicial attack as unreasonable restraints on alienation. 36 Traditionally, a direct restraint on
alienation has been viewed by many courts as invalid per se unless the
restraint falls within certain limited exceptions. 37 Under a minority approach, a direct restraint is void unless the policy underlying its purpose outweighs the degree of restraint imposed on the property
interest. 38 Indirect restraints, on the other hand, are generally deemed
valid if they are reasonable.3 9 An indirect restraint is one that arises
"when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than the
restraint on alienability, but with the incidental result that . . . [it]
would restrain practical alienability." 40 Thus, a mortgage that provides
for forfeiture of the mortgaged real estate to the mortgagee upon an
impermissible transfer probably constitutes a direct restraint. 41 To the
extent that the mortgagee is able to enforce, through specific performance or injunctive relief, a mortgagor's promise not to convey without
the mortgagee's consent, a promissory and presumably direct restraint
exists. 42
Under this analysis it is unclear whether the due-on-sale clause
constitutes a direct or an indirect restraint on alienation. On the one
hand, it can be argued that it constitutes an indirect restraint: enforcement of the clause will result in a foreclosure sale rather than a forfeiture of the mortgaged real estate to the mortgagee, and the due-on-sale
mortgagee does not have an enforceable right to prevent the mortgagor
from transferring the property. 43 Moreover, while the practical effect
of the clause may be to discourage the mortgagor from selling the mortLoan Ass'n, 103 l. App. 3d 174, 183, 430 N.E.2d 708, 715-16 (1981) (assignment of beneficial interest in Illinois land trust is not a "conveyance of title ... to all or any portion of the
premises" as phrase is used in due-on-sale clause). See also Hodge v. DMNS Co., 652
S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (due-on-sale clause not triggered by contract of sale
which is immediately rescinded).
36. See infra notes 37-61 & accompanying text.
37. See cases cited in Note, UnreasonableRestraint, supra note 9, at 335-36.
38. Id.
39. L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1112, at 5 (2d ed. 1956).
40. Id.
41. Volkmer, supra note 9, at 748.
42. Id.
43. R. BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE 47-48
(1979); 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 179 (Supp.
1982).
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gaged real estate, its primary purpose is to confer an economic benefit,
not to restrain alienability. 44
On the other hand, at least one commentator has concluded that a
due-on-sale clause is so "closely akin" to a'45promissory restraint as to
"justify designating it as a direct restraint.
Although written as an acceleration clause, the due-on-sale clause
directly and fundamentally burdens a mortgagor's ability to alienate
as surely and directly as a classical promissory restraint. As such, the
insofar as the category of
due-on-sale clause is truly a direct restraint
46
direct restraints can be articulated.

The vast majority of courts has been unconcerned about classifying the clause into traditional "restraint" categories. No court has held
that a due-on-sale clause is per se unlawful as a restraint on alienation.
Indeed, some courts have suggested that it is not a restraint on alienation at all.47 While many courts probably view the clause as an indirect
restraint on alienation, all courts recognize that there are circumstances

in which enforcement of the clause is reasonable and thus permissible. 48 Some courts, however, are more sympathetic to enforcement

than others, and two broad judicial approaches to the clause have
emerged.
Under the predominant judicial approach, the clause is deemed
per se reasonable unless the borrower can show that the lender engaged
in unconscionable conduct. 49 The courts employing this approach have
recognized the desirability of protecting the mortgagee from the vagarOSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 5.21.
45. Volkmer, supra note 9, at 773-74.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220, 228 (Iowa
1982); Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 206 Neb. 469, 471, 293 N.W.2d 843, 846
(1980); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. 1982).
48. See, e.g., State ex rel Bingaman v. Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 12, 636
P.2d 279, 289 (1981); Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1018-19
(Okla. 1977).
49. See, e.g., Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala. 1979); Income Realty &
44.

Mortgage Inc. v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, -

Colo. -,

-, 661 P.2d 257, 265 (1983);

Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 765, 463 A.2d 242, 248 (1983); Baker v. Loves Park Say. &
2d 119, 125, 333 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975); Martin v. Peoples Mut. Sav. & Loan
Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill.
Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220, 228-29 (Iowa 1982); Dunham v. Ware Save. Bank, 384 Mass. 63, 68,
423 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (Mass. 1981); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206
Neb. 469, 482, 293 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1980); First Commercial Title Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 92
Nev. 363, 365, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272 (1976); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121
N.H. 722, 725, 433 A.2d 1312, 1315-16 (1981); Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289
N.C. 620, 630-31, 224 S.E.2d 580, 587 (1976); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tenn.
1973); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. 1982); United Va.
Bank v. Best, 223 Va. 112, 114-15, 286 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1982); Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Say.

Bank, 34 Wash. App. 14, 20, 659 P.2d 537, 541 (1983).
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ies of the interest rate market.50 The mortgagee need not establish that
a proposed transfer would impair security; the validity of the due-on51
sale clause is not normally judged by the facts of an individual case.
Under one variant of this approach, such facts are relevant only to the
extent that the mortgagor attempts to meet the burden of proving that
enforcement is unconscionable or inequitable in his or her case.52 An

increase in the market interest rate is not usually thought sufficient to
meet this burden, and due-on-sale clauses in such jurisdictions are usu53
ally enforced.

Under the minority approach, enforcement of due-on-sale clauses

must be reasonable in individual cases, necessitating a case-by-case determination.5 4 Under this approach, the mortgagee's desire to increase

interest rates is not considered a sufficient reason to justify the clause.
The mortgagee has the burden to establish reasonableness, and nor-

mally must establish that the transfer would result in security impairment or an increased risk of default.5 5 As a practical matter, lenders
have rarely sought due-on-sale enforcement in jurisdictions that follow

this approach.
Some of the courts that apply the majority approach display a concern that the borrower be fairly warned that the clause can be employed to exact a higher interest rate upon transfer, and insist that
language explicitly stating that possibility be included in the documents.5 6 There may well be a valid need for such a warning; the
FNMA/FHLMC clause, for example, is extraordinarily technical and
50. See, e.g., Income Realty & Mortgage Inc. v. Columbia Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Colo.
P.2d 257, 261 (1983).
51. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 124, 333 N.E.2d 1,
5 (1971).
52. See, e.g., Tierce v. APS Co., 328 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979).
53. Id. at 487.
54. See, e.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 81, 486 P.2d 190, 193
(1971); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 855, 481 S.W.2d 725, 728
(1972); Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163,
168, 173, 250 N.W.2d 804, 808 (1977) (does not decide if a rate increase would have been
reasonable if the clause had mentioned rate increases); State ex rel Bingaman v. Valley Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 12, 636 P.2d 279, 283 (1981) (judicial extension of statute to loans
made before statute's effective date); Consolidated Capital Properties, II, Ltd. v. National
Bank of N. Am., 420 So. 2d 618, 622 (Fla. App. 1982); Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav. Bank,
34 Wash. App. 14, 20, 659 P.2d 537, 541 (1983).
55. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 385 (1978).
56. See First Southern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300, 304 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1977), overruledby Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Silver v. Rochester Say. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 86, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (1980).
-, ,661
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difficult for a lay reader to follow, and its implication that a higher
interest rate may result from a tranfer is oblique at best.57 One court
has been even more punctilious, requiring that the clause be inserted in

the promissory note and not merely in the mortgage. 58

As noted above, majority or "automatic enforcement" jurisdictions often state that due-on-sale clauses are unenforceable when the

mortgagor can establish that enforcement would be "unconscionable"
or "inequitable." 5 9 While it is difficult to articulate precisely when dueon-sale clauses will be so categorized, it is probable that most courts
will be unwilling to enforce the clauses in "non-substantive" or "nonsale" transfers. For example, one court has indicated that enforcement
should be denied in situations such as transfers to a spouse who becomes a co-owner, transfers to a spouse incidental to a marriage disso-

lution proceeding or settlement, and transfers to an inter vivos trust of
which the mortgagor is a beneficiary. 60 This principle is recognized in
the FNMA/FHLMC form due-on-sale clause, which specifically ex-

descent or by operation of law upon the
empts transfers "by devise,
61

death of a joint tenant."
Yet due-on-sale clauses should not be automatically unenforceable
in all "non-substantive" or "non-sale" settings. For example, if a mortgagor transfers realty as a gift to a donee-charity that is barely solvent,
the possession and ownership by the charity is likely to reduce the
value of the property or reduce the probability of payment of the debt.
In this situation it would hardly seem "unconscionable" or "inequitable" to enforce a due-on-sale clause.

57. The FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage, supra note 2, Clause 17 is thoroughly critiqued in
Squires, A Comprehensible Due-on-Sale Clause, 27 PRAC. LAW 67 (1981).
58. See 2140 Lincoln Park West v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 88 111.App. 3d
660, 664, 410 N.E.2d 990, 993 (1980) (requirement justified on ground that rule of law requires mortgage and trust deed to be interpreted separately). It is not clear that this sort of
technicality serves any purpose, and it may simply reflect the hostility of the court to enforcement of the clause.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
60. Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 433 A.2d 1312, 1316 (N.H. 1981). See
also Powell v. Phoenix Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 247, 253 (Ala. 1983) (suggesting
that enforcement of a due-on-sale clause may be "unconscionable" where the mortgagor
sells part of the mortgaged real estate, but retains title to and continues to live on the other
part); Home Say. Bank v. Baer Properties, Ltd., 92 A.D.2d 98, 101, 460 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835-36
(1983) (mortgagee attempt to invoke due-on-sale clause upon transfer of property from a
corporation to its sole shareholder held unconscionable and unenforceable). On the other
hand, the sale to a third party of all the shares of a mortgagor-corporation has been deemed
sufficient to trigger due-on-sale enforcement. See United States v. Med 0 Farm, Inc., 701
F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1983).
61. FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage, supra note 2, Clause 17 (one to four family).
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Due-on-Encumbrance Clauses
The validity of due-on-encumbrance clauses rarely has been litigated. As we noted earlier, 62 such clauses are used primarily as a
means of protecting against security impairment that may occur when
junior mortgage indebtedness reduces the mortgagor's economic stake
in the mortgaged real estate. Interest market motivation, if it exists in
the due-on-encumbrance situation, is clearly less significant than in the
due-on-sale setting. 6 3 Thus it is not surprising that the few reported
due-on-encumbrance decisions permitted enforcement of the clause
only when "reasonably necessary to protect the lender's security." 64
Increased-Interest-on-Transfer Clauses
Increased-interest-on-transfer clauses are much less common than
due-on-sale clauses and there is relatively little case law concerning
their validity. Interestingly, the few courts that have confronted such
clauses have upheld them, 65 even though these same jurisdictions restrict due-on-sale enforcement to situations in which the mortgagee can
prove impairment of security.6 6 One of these courts justified the difference in treatment between the two types of clauses by saying that an
increased-interest-on-transfer provision, unlike a due-on-sale clause,
"simply raises the interest rate should the mortgagor assign his rights
and benefits under the mortgage to a subsequent purchaser." 67 From a
policy viewpoint this distinction makes little sense, as the primary goal
of both types of clauses is higher interest rates. Legally there is some
difference, in that an unconsented transfer under an increased-interest
clause does not automatically constitute a default; acceleration and
foreclosure ensue only if the transferee refuses to make mortgage payments based on the increased interest rate. 68 Increased-interest clauses
62. See supra text accompanying note 22.
63. See Volkmer, supra note 9, at 770.
64. La Sala v. American Say. &Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 881,489 P.2d 1113,1124,97
Cal. Rptr. 849, 860 (1971). See also Chilivis v. Tumlin Woods Realty Ass'n, Inc., 250 Ga.
179, 184, 297 S.E.2d 4, 8 (1982) (suggesting a "reasonableness--impairment of security"
standard).
65. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Dockendorff, 415 So. 35, 36-37 (Fla. App. 1982); Miller v.
Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 406-07, 545 P.2d 546, 549 (1976).
66. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. App.
1980); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 441,553 P.2d
1090, 1092 (1976).
67. O'Connell v. Dockendorff, 415 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. App. 1982).
68. However, even with a due-on-sale clause, foreclosure cannot automatically follow
the transfer. The loan principal must first be accelerated; the default is the failure to pay the
accelerated amount upon demand. See Miller v. Cote, 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 179 Cal. Rptr.
753 (1982).
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should find an even more favorable enforcement environment in states
that automatically enforce due-on-sale clauses in the absence of uncon-

scionability. Because increased-interest clauses are technically less burdensome on alienation than are due-on-sale clauses, logically they
should be enforced at least to the same extent as their due-on-sale

counterparts.
No-transfer Provisions in Installment Land Contracts
While there was some early support for enforcement of "no-transfer" provisions in installment land contracts, 69 contemporary courts are

much less sympathetic. This attitude is reflected in two ways. First,
"no-transfer" language is often construed narrowly against the vendor.70 Second, in contrast to the majority approach to due-on-sale
clause enforcement, courts often eschew an "automatic enforcement"
approach; the "no-transfer" language is enforced only when it is established that the transfer will impair the vendor's security. 7 1 Moreover,
even when a vendor demonstrates such an impairment, it is likely that

a court will avoid the imposition of forfeiture by permitting the transferee to pay off the contract balance, or by ordering that the real estate
72
be foreclosed by public sale.
69. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 39, § 1164; Goddard, Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts,31 MICH. L. Rv. 1, 9-11 (1932); Grismore, Effect ofa Restrictionon
Assignment in a Contract, 31 MICH. L. REv. 299, 316-17 (1933).
70. See, e.g., Conner v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 534, 537, 439
N.E.2d 122, 125 (1982) (transfer by trustee holding the vendee's contract interest to a successor trustee held not to constitute a "conveyance or assignment" for purposes of no-transfer
clause); Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Stevenson, 534 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1975) (transfer by vendee to a lender as security for a loan held not within meaning of a no-transfer
clause).
71. See Lemon v. Nicolai, 33 Mich. App. 646, 649, 190 N.W.2d 549, 550 (1971); Pellerito v. Weber, 22 Mich. App. 242, 244-45, 177 N.W.2d 236, 237-38 (1970); Terry v. Born, 24
Wash. App. 652, 655, 604 P.2d 504, 506 (1979).
72. See Handzel v. Bassi, 343 Ill. App. 281, 289, 99 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1951) (assignee
permitted to perform fully rather than undergo forfeiture); Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.
v. Stevenson, 534 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1975) (assignee allowed to pay off balance); Coraci v.
Noack, 61 Wisc. 2d 183, 190, 212 N.W.2d 164, 167 (1973) (assignee granted right to redemption). In Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 604 P.2d 504 (1979), for example, the court held
that the vendor should have been required to establish that enforcement of the contract
provision was necessary to protect his security. Id. at 655, 604 P.2d at 506. The court also
emphasized that even if, on remand, the trial court found the requisite impairment of security, it should give serious consideration to permitting vendee to prepay the contract balance
as an alternative to forfeiture. Id. See also OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at
313-14.
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State Legislative Regulation of Mortgage Transfer Restrictions
Before the Act
Several states have imposed legislative limitations on due-on-sale
clauses. 73 While the details of these statutes vary considerably, they
commonly prohibit due-on-sale enforcement in residential mortgages
unless the mortgagee can establish that a transfer would impair mortgage security.74 Most of the statutes permit the mortgagee to condition
transfer of the property upon payment of a limited "assumption fee" or
upon an increase in the mortgage interest rate by a modest amount,
usually no more than one percent. 75 Some of the statutes impose similar restrictions on increased-interest-on-transfer provisions. 76 In addition, at least one state, Iowa, confers generous post-foreclosure
redemption rights when real estate is foreclosed incident to enforcement of a due-on-sale clause. 77
73. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-806.01 (1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-165
(1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 67-3002 (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.8 (West Supp. 1982);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-7-11 to -14 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.20 (West Supp.
1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-15-1 to -10 (Supp. 1981).
A few additional states have statutes of only minor or procedural importance, and are
not discussed in the text. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2924.5 (West 1974) (requiring that due-onsale clause in loan secured by one to four unit dwelling be placed in both the promissory
note and deed of trust to be enforceable); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254-a (McKinney Supp.
1982) (if due-on-sale clause is triggered, mortgagee may not collect any prepayment penalty); PA. STATE. ANN. tit. 41, § 403(6) (Purdon Supp. 1982) (prior to foreclosure, lender
must notify debtor of debtor's right, if any, to transfer the property to another subject to the
security interest); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 44-8-28 (Supp. 1982) (due-on-sale clause enforceable only if notice by statutory language is given in the mortgage in capital letters or
underlined). See also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6.837 (West Supp. 1982) (building and loan
associations expressly authorized to enforce due-on-sale clauses).
74. See, e.g, CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-30-165(a) (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.8 (West
Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-13 (Supp. 1979).
75. See, e.g., ARIz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 33-806.01(c) (1971) (1/2 of 1%maximum rate
increase); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30-165(b)-(c) (1982) (1% maximum rate increase, 1/2%
maximum fee); GA. CODE ANN. § 67-3002 (1982) (1% maximum rate increase, 1/2% to 1%
maximum fee, depending on whether borrower is released and whether rate is raised); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 535.8 (West Supp. 1982) (1% maximum fee); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-14
(Supp. 1981) (1/2% maximum fee); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-15-8.5 (Supp. 1981) (1% maximum rate increase at time of assumption, further 1%increase 5 years later, but rate may
never exceed 1%below weighted average yield at most recent FHLMC weekly auction; 1%
maximum fee).
76. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 67-3002 (Supp. 1982) (1% maximum rate increase per
annum); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-15-2, -4 (Supp. 1981) (assumption fee limited to 1% of
outstanding indebtedness).
77. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.8(2)(e) (West Supp. 1982). While normally an Iowa
mortgagor has only a one year post-sale redemption right, id § 628.3 (West 1950), when
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property results from the enforcement of a due-on-sale
clause, the mortgagor may redeem the real property at any time within three years from the
day of sale, id § 535.8(2)(e) (West Supp. 1982). In the meantime, the mortgagor is entitled
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A few other states legislatively prohibit due-on-sale enforcement
in "non-substantive" and certain non-sale transfers. 78 In California,
for example, acceleration is prohibited in residential mortgages when
there is a transfer to a spouse resulting from the death of the mortgagor, to a spouse who becomes a co-owner, to a spouse incident to a
marriage dissolution, or to an inter vivos trust of which the mortgagor
is a beneficiary. 7 9 In addition, some statutes deny enforcement of dueon-encumbrance clauses in a variety of residential housing settings.80
Federal Regulation of Due-on-Sale Clauses Before the Act
In 1976 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Board), the federal
agency that regulates federally-chartered and federally-insured savings
and loan associations, became concerned about the increasing controversy over whether federally-chartered associations had the authority
to enforce due-on-sale clauses. The Board issued a regulation effective
July 31, 1976 (1976 Regulation) which provided that a federal
association
continues to have the power to include... a provision in its loan
instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable sums secured by the association's security
instrument if all or any part of the real property securing the loan is
sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's prior
written consent.8 '
Except as provided in paragraph (g) of the regulation, the Board authorized federal associations to exercise the due-on-sale option and
provided that all rights and remedies of the association and borrower
"shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract. '8 2
Paragraph (g) prohibited due-on-sale enforcement in certain "nonsubstantive" transfers of mortgagor-occupied homes resulting from
junior liens, purchase-money security interests in household applito possession of the property and for the first thirty months after the sale, the right of redemption is exclusive. Id. The time for redemption by creditors is extended to thirty-three
months in any case in which the mortgagor's period for redemption is extended. Id. This
statute represents a significant burden on lenders.
This type of redemption should not be confused with "equitable redemption," available
in every state, which allows the mortgagor and junior lienors to pay off a mortgage in default
at any time until a valid foreclosure sale has occurred. See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 3, at 425.
78. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.6 (West Supp. 1983).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., id § 2949 (West 1974) (single family, owner-occupied dwellings); VA.
CODE § 6.1-2.5 (1979) (one to four family residential dwellings).
81. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1983).
82. Id.
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ances, transfers by devise, descent, or operation of law upon the death
of a joint tenant, and leaseholds for less than three years with no option
to purchase.8 3 In the preamble to the 1976 Regulation the Board also
expressed its intent that the due-on-sale practices of federal associations be governed exclusively by federal law, and emphasized that fed-

eral associations "shall not be bound by or subject to any conflicting
state law which imposes different

. . .

due-on-sale requirements." 84

A similar regulation was promulgated in 1978 by the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA) to apply to due-on-sale clauses
in federal credit union mortgages.85 The NCUA regulation went beyond the 1976 Board Regulation by specifically requiring federal credit
unions to utilize due-on-sale clauses as well as preempting state restric86
tions on due-on-sale clause enforcement.
While lower federal courts concluded that the 1976 Board Regulation foreclosed the application of state due-on-sale law to federal associations, 87 a few state courts reached contrary results.88 Ultimately,
this conflict was resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Fidelity First FederalSavings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta,89 a case
that addressed the effect of the 1976 Regulation on California law.
California generally limited due-on-sale enforcement to situations in

which impairment of mortgage security was established. 90 In de la
Cuesta, the Supreme Court held that: 1) the Board intended to preempt
state law;9 1 2) the 1976 Regulation in fact conflicted with California
law, despite the fact that it merely authorized, and did not require, federal associations to utilize due-on-sale clauses; 92 3) the Board acted
83. Id. § 545.8-3(g). This language tracks the FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage, supra note
2, Clause 17 (one to four family).
84. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286, 18,287 (1976).
85. See 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6(d) (1983).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Dantus v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (C.D. Ill.
1979), appealdismissed, 638 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1980); Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 907 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
88. See, e.g., Panko v. Pan Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 119 Cal.App. 3d 916, 924, 174
Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1117 (1982); see also First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 160 (Fla. App. 1980) (Board Regulation, while "not
invalid," does not prohibit a state court from applying traditional equitable principles to
deny acceleration "absent any allegation or proof of impairment of security"); Holiday
Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 477-78 (Minn. 1981).
89. 458 U.S. 141 (1982). For a critical analysis of de la Cuesta, see Segreti, supra note
9, at 803-06.
90. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385-86,
582 P.2d 970, 976-77 (1978).
91. Fidelity First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154, 159.
92. Id. at 154.
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within its statutory authority under section 5(a) of the Home Owner's
Loan Act, 93 which authorized the Board to promulgate rules for the
operation and regulation of federal associations; 94 and 4) although the
1976 Regulation's merits might be debatable, it was a reasonable, and
95
therefore a valid, exercise of the Board's authority.
The de la Cuesta Court did not address the enforceability of dueon-sale clauses included in the mortgage loans made by federal associations before the effective date of the 1976 Board Regulation. 96 The
Board had issued an earlier regulation 97 that one federal court held
sufficient to preempt contrary state due-on-sale law as to pre-1976 Regulation loans.98 Also, the 1976 Regulation specified that a federal association "continues" to have the power to include due-on-sale clauses in
their mortgages. 99 Although this language may have represented bureaucratic timidity in dealing with the retroactivity issue, it can be argued that it signified the Board's view that it had already preempted
state law before 1976. The Supreme Court in de la Cuesta, however,
expressly avoided reaching the retroactivity question. 1°° While de la
Cuesta confirmed the validity of the Board's response to the needs of
federally-chartered savings associations with respect to due-on-sale
clauses, it did nothing for other types of lenders. Therefore, these lenders sought a uniform national solution: congressional preemption of
state laws restricting the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.
The Galn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
The enactment of section 341 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982).
94. Fidelity First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159-61.
95. Id. at 170.
96. Id. at 170-71.
97. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(a) (1983) (originally promulgated July 3, 1979). The regulation
stated only that loan instruments "shall. . . provide for full protection to the Federal association." Id.
98. Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
Note that this decision was rendered prior to de la Cuesta.
99. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 81.
100. Two of the deeds of trust in de la Cuesta were executed prior to both the Wellenkamp decision in 1978 and the effective date of the Board Regulation in 1976. The debtors argued that the Board Regulation could not be applied so as to destroy the debtors'
rights. However, the Supreme Court avoided this question because it concluded that California law in effect at the date the two deeds of trust were executed was consistent with the
Board Regulation. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170
n.24 (1982). For further considertion of the California law, see infra text accompanying
notes 204-52.
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Institutions Act of 1982 (Act)' 0 1 signaled the dawn of a new era for
due-on-sale clause enforcement. The Act broadly preempts state laws
that restrict the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses, thereby making
such clauses generally enforceable.
Yet Congress responded to effective lobbying by the real estate
brokerage industry and related interests' 0 2 by softening the impact of
the Act in most states that previously restricted due-on-sale enforcement. To accomplish this, Congress created complex exceptions to the
preemption based on so-called "window periods,"' I 3 and conferred authority on states with window periods to enact legislation to avoid the
impact of the Act on certain mortgage loans.'04 In so doing, Congress
created a host of important and difficult interpretation problems. Congress delegated to the Board the authority to issue regulations interpreting the Act, 0 5 and in April, 1983, the Board issued a final regulation
entitled "Preemption of State Due-on-Sale Laws" (Regulation). 0 6 The
following sections of this Article analyze the more important provisions
of the Act and Regulation, their scope, and the complex problems of
interpretation they have engendered. We consider whether the Regulation reflects congressional intent, and to what extent the Act and Regulation achieve sound public policy goals.
Lenders Covered
The Act covers any "person or government agency making a real
property loan."' 0 7 According to the Regulation, the foregoing definition includes,
without limitation, individuals, Federal associations, state-chartered
savings and loan associations, national banks, state-chartered banks
and state-chartered mutual savings banks, Federal credit unions,
state-chartered credit unions, mortgage banks, insurance companies
101.

12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982).

102. See generally Savings and Loan Aid Package Boosts Powers of Banks, Thrifs, 40
CONG. Q. 2423 (1982); MortgageAssumption PlanApproved, 40 CoNG. Q. 2126 (1982); Senate Passes Comprehensive FinancialInstitutions Bill, 10 Hous. & DEv. RPTR. (BNA) 356
(1982); The Washington Front, CAL. REAL EST., Nov. 1982, at 2; U.S. Law on Home-Mortgage Assumptions Will Create LegalLimbos in Some States, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1982, at 10,
col. 1.
103. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 178-302.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982). See infra notes 303-09 & accompanying text.
105. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(e)(1) (1982). The Board is required to consult with the National Credit Union Administration and the Comptroller of the Currency before issuing
regulations.
106. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 591).
107. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(2) (1982). Also included is "any assignee or transferee, in
whole or in part, of such a person or agency."
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and finance companies which make real property loans, manufactured-home retailers who extend credit, agencies of the Federal government, [and] any lender approved by the Secretary of Housing and
mortgage insurance
Urban Development for participation in 1any
08
program under the National Housing Act.

The Board emphasized that the foregoing list is "intended to be representative and not exclusive." 1 9 Consequently, every mortgagee,

whether a natural person, business entity, or government agency, is
covered by the Act.
Although Congress clearly has the power under the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution ° to regulate institutional
lenders insofar as their activities affect interstate commerce,"I an argument could be made that Congress lacks the power to regulate due-on-

sale clauses in purely intrastate mortgage transactions between private,
non-institutional parties. Congress is authorized to regulate intrastate

activity so long as it rationally concludes that the activity affects interstate commerce or commerce in more than one state.' 2 At first glance,
it seems difficult to conclude that an isolated, intrastate, non-institutional mortgage transaction meets this test. 1 3 However, under the pre-

108. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(g)).
109. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,555 (1983) (definitions section of the Regulation). In one recent
case, Lucas v. Jones, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 1012 n.6, 196 Cal. Rptr. 437, 440 n.6 (1983), the
California Court of Appeal held that the Regulation is inapplicable to individuals making
private loans. This conclusion is obviously wrong: the Regulation refers to coverage of
"individuals," see supra text accompanying note 108, and the Act refers to "a person...
making a real property loan," 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(2) (1982). The Lucas court's mistaken
interpretation is based on language in the Preamble to the Regulation, as published in the
Federal Register, that describes "Small entities to which the rule will apply." 48 Fed. Reg.
21,560 (1983). While this description mentions only financial institutions and government
and corporate entities, it clearly is not intended to limit the coverage of the Regulation to
such entities. Rather, the language was inserted in the Preamble merely to comply with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3) (1982), which requires an agency publishing
a final rule to describe "altenatives ... designed to minimize any significant economic impact of the rule on small entities." The Act defines "small entity" to include businesses,
nonprofit enterprises, and local government jurisdictions. Id § 601(6). Since individuals
are not included in this definition, they were not explicitly mentioned by the Board in the
portion of the Preamble described above.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
111. See McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 271 Ark. 503, 611 S.W.2d 767 (1981); J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165-67 (2d ed. 1983).

112. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-54 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 255, 248 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). See generally McLain v.
Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1979); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
at 161-70.
YOUNG, supra note 111,

113. Suppose, for example, that after the effective date of the Act, ME sold an unimproved lake lot located in State X to MR and that ME took back a note and mortgage for
part of the purchase price. Both ME and MR were residents of State X. The mortgage
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vailing commerce clause interpretation the impact on commerce of a
single transaction is largely irrelevant.1 4 Indeed, the Court has suggested that federal courts lack the power to make an independent determination as to the interstate ramifications of each litigant's behavior:
"Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the
reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial,
individual instances' of the class."' 1 5
Application of this reasoning leads to the conclusion that Congress
has ample power under the commerce clause to reach purely local and
private mortgage transactions. Perhaps Congress believed that making
due-on-sale clauses enforceable in non-institutional mortgage settings
would encourage private seller financing at a time when institutional
financing was both expensive and difficult to obtain. In any event,
while a due-on-sale clause included in an isolated private mortgage
transaction probably cannot be said to affect interstate commerce, it
was not irrational for Congress to conclude that the cumulative impact
of many such transactions on the national mortgage market is
significant.
Loans Covered
The Act covers every "loan, mortgage, advance, or credit sale secured by a lien on real property, the stock allocated to a dwelling unit
in a cooperative housing corporation, or a residential manufactured
home, whether real or personal property." 116 Although the Act makes
no reference to mortgages on leasehold interests, the Regulation provides that a loan is secured by a lien on real property if it is made on
the "security of any instrument. . . which makes. . . a leasehold or
subleasehold . . .specific security for payment of the obligation se7
cured by the instrument.""1
contained a due-on-sale clause. A year later MR sold and conveyed the lot to Grantee, a
wealthy resident of State X, without permission of ME. ME then accelerated the mortgage
debt and commenced a judicial foreclosure proceeding. If under the case law of State X, a
due-on-sale clause is enforceable only if the transfer impairs mortgage security, a requirement which ME cannot satisfy, ME cannot accelerate the loan. If the Act applies, however,
the due-on-sale clause is automatically enforceable. The issue is whether Congress has sufficient commerce clause authority to reach this type of isolated, intrastate non-institutional
transaction.
114. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (cumulative effect of "trivial" local
activities can have substantial impact on interstate commerce); see also Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
115. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 193 (1968)) (emphasis in original).
116. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(3) (1982).
117. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(h)).
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As Professor Richard Powell aptly observed, "[w]hen a statute affecting 'real property' is in preparation, careful consideration should be
addressed to the policy question of its applicability to the interests of
lessees, and. . . unambiguous language should be inserted in the statute to define its intended inclusion, or exclusion, of such interests."11 8
It is unfortunate that Congress neglected to follow this useful advice.
Since Congress failed specifically to place leasehold mortgages within
the coverage of the Act, it could be argued that the Board lacked authority to do so in the Regulation. Under this reasoning, a leasehold
mortgage cannot be a "lien on real property" because the leasehold is

personal property or a "chattel real.""19 The phrase "real or personal"

property, as utilized in the Act,' 20 refers only to liens on residential
manufactured homes, and thus cannot be used to buttress a conclusion
that the Act covers all leasehold mortgages.
It seems probable, however, that the foregoing argument will fail.
To be sure, courts continue to characterize leaseholds as personal property for some purposes' 2 ' and, as Professor Powell noted, this is a "field

of judgment and of pragmatic utility, where disagreement is not unlikely." 122 Nevertheless, the courts have treated leasehold mortgages as
mortgages on real estate in a variety of contexts. 2 3 Most contemporary
mortgages on leasehold interests arise in commercial real estate settings
where the mortgagor is often an experienced and sophisticated real estate developer.' 24 It seems unlikely that Congress intended due-on-sale
118. 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 190-91 (1982).
119. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.12 (1952); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 8 comment c (1936).
120. See supra text accompanying note 116.
121. See, e.g., Stagecrafters' Club, Inc. v. District of Columbia Div. of Am. Legion, 110
F. Supp. 481 (D.D.C. 1953) (leasehold deemed personalty and thus subject to execution sale
for federal taxes owed by lessee); Shaeffer v. Baeringer, 345 Pa. 32, 29 A.2d 697 (1943)
(lessee held not a person having an "interest in land" under a statute requiring all such
persons to join in a judicial application to compel a mortgagee to assign his mortgage after
payment).
122. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 118, at 189. See also MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 64 (1962).
123. See, e.g., Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 83 Ariz. 181, 184-86, 318 P.2d 359, 361 (1957)
(assignment of lease as security for a loan and sublease back to lessee deemed to be a real
property mortgage which could only be foreclosed by judicial action); Fidelity Trust Co. v.
Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 188, 221 N.W. 111, 112 (1928) (statute imposing tax on real
estate mortgages held applicable to a mortgage on a term for years); Abraham v. Fioramonte, 158 Ohio St. 213, 222-25, 107 N.E.2d 321, 326-27 (1952) (leasehold could not be
made subject of chattel mortgage, but must be mortgaged in accordance with formalities
associated with real estate mortgages).
124. See generally G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 1062-75 (2d ed. 1981); Committee on Leases, Ground Leases and Their Financing, 4 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 437, 438 (1969).
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clauses to be enforceable against residential fee owner mortgagors, who
generally have a relatively weak bargaining position as against their
mortgagees, while states remain free to restrict enforcement of such
clauses for the benefit of commercial mortgagor-lessees who frequently
have relatively strong negotiating strength vis-a-vis their mortgage
lenders.
Types of Mortgage Transfer Restrictions Covered
The Act preempts state law only with respect to due-on-sale
clauses that "authoriz[e] a lender, at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender's security instrument if all or any part
of the property, or an interest therein, securing the real property loan is
sold or transferred without the lender's prior written consent."'' 2 5 The
26
Regulation adopts this statutory definition virtually unchanged.'
Presumably the Act is inapplicable to an increased-interest-ontransfer clause because that type of clause confers on the lender only
the right to modify or increase the interest rate upon a sale or transfer
and not the "option to declare [the debt] due and payable."' 2 7 Consequently, every state is probably free to make increased-interest-ontransfer provisions unenforceable. This result is bizarre, for such
clauses have an economic effect similar to that of the due-on-sale
clauses.' 2 8 Nevertheless, the practical effect of excluding increased-interest-on-transfer provisions from the scope of the Act is unlikely to be
substantial. Mortgagees can simply include due-on-sale language in
any mortgages executed after the Act's effective date. As to pre-Act
loans, few state courts are likely to exercise their freedom. In states
that follow an automatic enforcement approach to the due-on-sale
clause,' 2 9 courts are unlikely to restrict enforcement of an increasedinterest-on-transfer provision, as it is the less burdensome of the two
clauses. Even in states that impose substantial restrictions on due-onsale clause enforcement, courts that have addressed the issue have been
less hostile toward enforcement of increased-interest-on-transfer
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(l) (1982).
126. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(b)). The only substantive difference in the Regulation's due-on-sale definition is the insertion of the word
"immediately" prior to the words "due and payable."
127. See supra text accompanying note 24. Acceleration can occur only if the transferee
defaults in paying the increased mortgage payments. See also O'Connell v. Dockendorff,
415 So. 2d 35 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (increased interest on transfer provision is not a due-onsale clause for purposes of state case law that limits due-on-sale enforcement to impairment
of security situations).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 65-68.
129. See supra notes 49-53 & accompanying text.
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clauses. 130 Courts in these latter states are thus not likely to take advantage of this "loophole" in the Act's preemptive effect.
One could draft mortgage language that would fall outside the
Act's definition of a due-on-sale clause. For example, a provision for
automatic acceleration upon transfer seems to be outside the definition,
which speaks of the lender's "option" to accelerate. Similarly, a clause
that merely makes an unapproved transfer by the mortgagor a default,
but says nothing about acceleration, may fall outside the Act. However, this argument is weakened if the mortgage or note also contains a
standard acceleration-for-default clause that the courts could read together with the no-transfer clause to find the equivalent of a due-onsale clause. These illustrations should have little practical importance,
since in post-Act mortgages well-advised lenders will simply refrain
from using such uncommon and idiosyncratic language. An occasional
pre-Act document may raise this sort of problem, but the number of
documents with such non-standard clauses is small. In any event, only
clauses in states that restrict due-on-sale enforcement potentially pose a
problem. In overall economic terms, then, the Act's narrow definition
of a due-on-sale clause is likely to be of little importance.
Coverage of Installment Land Contracts
While the Act itself does not specifically mention installment land
contracts, its preemption does apply to any "loan, mortgage, advance,
or credit sale secured by a lien on real property."' 13 Does an installment contract vendor retain a "lien on real property," as well as legal
title? The Regulation answers affirmatively, 132 and is probably correct.' 33 While a few courts have had conceptual difficulty with the notion that one can have legal title to land and a lien on it
simultaneously, 134 there is substantial authority that the installment
land contract vendor retains a "vendor's lien" for the unpaid purchase
price. 13 5 Moreover, courts are increasingly equating installment land
130. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
131. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(3) (1982).
132. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(h)) ("'loan secured
by a lien on real property' means a loan on the security on any instrument (whether a mortgage, deed of trust, or land contract) which makes the interest in real property (whether in
fee or on a leasehold or subleasehold) specific security for the payment of the obligation
secured by the instrument") (emphasis added).
133. See Karim v. Werner, 333 N.W.2d 877, 878 n.1 (Minn. 1983) (noting the possible
application of the Act, but concluding that the due-on-sale clause was valid under state law).
134. See, e.g., Allen v. Wilson, 178 Cal. 674, 174 P. 661 (1918).
135. See, e.g., Forty-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 E. Broadway, 135 Ariz.
265, 267, 660 P.2d 866 (1983); Bean v. Walker, 95 A.D.2d 70, 73, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897
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contracts with mortgages, and requiring foreclosure as the vendor's pri136
mary remedy. In such cases the vendor is surely foreclosing a "lien."'
Finally, while the analytical underpinnings for their decisions are not
always clear, numerous courts routinely afford the vendor the option to
foreclose an installment land contract as a mortgage. 137 This practice
constitutes a persuasive argument that the contract vendor is also a
"lienor."
The conclusion that the Act's preemption applies to installment
land contracts does not mean that a violation of a contract prohibition
on transfer will necessarily result in a forfeiture of the vendee's interest.
When no-transfer provisions are upheld, it is likely that foreclosure of
the contract will instead be ordered, and then only after the vendee has
been afforded the opportunity to pay off the contract balance. 38 The
Act does not appear to change this. Literally, it only validates "due-onsale" clauses-those that authorize the acceleration of the debt when
the real estate is tranferred without the lender's consent. 139 A prohibition on transfer that purports to go beyond simple acceleration, and
defines the remedies (such as forfeiture) to be imposed on the vendee, is
unaffected by the Act and is thus still subject to pre-Act state law. It is
highly improbable that a state court would enforce forfeiture, with its
harsh consequences, simply because a transfer was made without the
vendor's consent. A more likely judicial response would be to permit
foreclosure of the contract as a mortgage. Such an approach would not
be inconsistent with the policy inherent in the Act.
Time of Transfer
The Act applies to all mortgage loans, whether consumated before
or after October 15, 1982, the effective date of the Act. However, a
40
transfer is covered only if it is made after the Act's effective date.'
Although the Act itself does not state this, this conclusion is supported
by the well-settled rule that a statute has only prospective effect unless
(1983); Braunstein v. Trottier, 54 Or. App. 687, 690, 635 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1981); 3 AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY § 11.73 (1952); Comment, supra note 26, at 89.
136. See supra text accompanying note 29.
137. See, e.g., Land Assocs. v. Becker, 294 Or. 308, 314, 656 P.2d 927, 931 (1982); Comment, supra note 26, at 89; Note, ForfeitureandtheIowa Installment Land Contract,46 IowA
L. REV. 786, 795-96 (1961).
138. See supra text accompanying note 72.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(1) (1982).
140. See Home Sav. Bank v. Baer Properties, Ltd., 92 A.D.2d 98, 101,460 N.Y.S.2d 833,
835-36 (1983). The Regulations seem to agree with respect to window period loans. See 12
C.F.R. § 591.4(c)(2) (1983).
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Congress evinces a clear intent that it have retroactive effect. 14 1 Congress indicated no such intent regarding the Act. Note, however, that
federally-chartered savings and loan associations have the authority to
enforce due-on-sale clauses as to many pre-Act transfers by virtue of
the 1976 Regulation upheld in the de la Cuesta case. 142 The Act itself
143
recognizes this authority.
The application of the Act can be illustrated as follows. Suppose
that on March 1, 1982, MR transferred mortgaged real estate located in
State X to Grantee in violation of a due-on-sale clause contained in the
mortgage executed in 1980. During early 1983, ME (a state-chartered
lender) accelerated the debt and commenced judicial foreclosure proceedings. Because the transfer took place before October 15, 1982, the
Act is inapplicable and the State X court is free to apply state law to
such pre-Act transfers.
While the Act is inapplicable to pre-Act transfers, it is retroactive
in the sense that it governs mortgage loans executed prior to the Act's
effective date. Thus, if in the previous example the property had been
mortgaged in 1980, but the transfer had taken place on December 20,
1982, the Act would have applied, and the due-on-sale clause would
have been enforceable.
Is this type of retroactivity unconstitutional? While the contract
clause 144 of the United States Constitution limits only state power to
impair the obligation of contracts, certain restrictions on federal power
to enact retroactive legislation are implicit in the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.145 In applying the due process clause to legislation that has retroactive effects, the Supreme Court has often focused
on whether the legislation defeats the reasonable expectations of the
parties. 146 However, even when this is the case, retroactive legislation
will be sustained if it is rationally related to a valid governmental
purpose. 147
The Act clearly satisfies this constitutional standard. First, it applies only to mortgages that contain due-on-sale clauses. Consequently, the Act is relevant only when the parties have specifically
141. United States v. Security Ind. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407, 413 (1982).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 81-100.
143. See 12 U.S.C. § 170j-3(c)(2)(C) (1982); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 591.3).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
111, at 471-72.
146.

J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 111, at 474-75.

147.

See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 423 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
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agreed that the debt could be accelerated in the event of an unapproved
transfer. Under these circumstances a mortgagor can hardly argue that
enforcement of the agreement is a total surprise. In a sense, therefore,
the Act enhances rather than impairs the obligations created by the
contract. Second, although certain mortgagors in states that previously
restricted due-on-sale enforcement may argue that they executed their
mortgages under the assumption that such clauses were usually unenforceable and that the Act upset their reasonable expectations, such
mortgagors are protected by the "window period" concept, examined
in detail later in this Article. 148 Finally, even without the window period provisions, the retroactive effect of the Act is rationally related to a
valid governmental purpose. The Act reflects a legitimate congressional concern about the economic distress of the savings and loan industry. 149 Enforcing due-on-sale clauses as to future transfers under
pre-Act mortgages surely is one rational means of alleviating that
financial distress.' 50
Transfers in Which Due-on-Sale Enforcement is Prohibited
The Act expressly enumerates several types of transfers that may
not be used as the basis for due-on-sale acceleration. The list is similar,
but not identical, to the analogous provisions of the FNMA/FHLMC
mortgage form and the 1976 FHLBB regulations.' 5' It includes:
1) the creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the
lender's security instrument which does not relate to a transfer of
rights of occupancy in the property;
2) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household
appliances;
3) a transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a
joint tenant or tenant by the entirety;
4) the granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to purchase;
5) a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower;
6) a transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become
an owner of the property;
7) a transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage,
legal separation agreement, or from an incidental property settlement
agreement, by which the spouse of the borrower becomes an owner
of the property;
8) a transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and
remains a beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of rights
of occupancy in the property; or
148.
149.
150.
151.

See infra text accompanying notes 178-302.
See supra notes 12-14 & accompanying text.
See supra note 14 & accompanying text.
See supra note 83 & accompanying text.
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9) any other transfer or disposition described in
152 regulations prescribed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.

When a transfer of one of these types is involved, the Act is preemptive:
acceleration under a due-on-sale clause is prohibited even if permitted
by state law. Moreover, these prohibitions apply on their face to all
types of loan documents.
Most of these transfers fall within the "non- substantive" or "nonsale" category considered earlier, 53 as to which due-on-sale enforcement probably would be impermissible under state law. Not all of
these transfers, however, can be so categorized. For example, in item
(1) above, the Act prohibits due-on-sale enforcement upon the creation
of a junior lien if no transfer of occupancy is involved. 154 Suppose a
first mortgage on a shopping center contains a prohibition on further
encumbrances without the mortgagee's consent. If the mortgagor borrows money for a non-business purpose and gives the lender a junior
mortgage on the center, the Act appears to prohibit acceleration. This
is true even if the first mortgagee can establish that the junior lien will
increase the risk of mortgagor default or will impair the security of its
mortgage. This result may come as an unpleasant surprise to countless
mortgage lenders who rely on the due-on-encumbrance concept in a
variety of commercial lending contexts.
The 1983 Bank BoardRegulation

The Board sought to avoid such a result by limiting the application of the statutory list to mortgage loans made "on the security of a
home occupied.

. .

by the borrower."' 155 Even though such a limitation

is absent from the Act itself, the Board argued in its preamble to the
Regulation that "this approach is most consistent with the Congressional purpose of restricting due-on-sale exercise to protect consumers."' 156 While it is true that courts sometimes defer to an interpretation
of a statute by the agency charged with its administration, 57 there is
also a strong tradition that the "plain meaning" of an unambiguous
statute should be respected.' 58
The Board justified its interpretation of what seems to be an un152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
netti v.

12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d) (1982).
See supra text accompanying notes 59-6 1.
12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d)(1) (1982).
48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)).
Id at 21,559.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 451 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1972).
See e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940); CamiUnited States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). See generally H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J.

FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 790-815 (1973).
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ambiguous statute on two grounds. First, it relied on a report about the
Act issued by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs. 159 In discussing the prohibition on acceleration in the further
encumbrance situation, the Committee referred to home improvement
loans and loans to send a mortgagor's child to colege. 160 The Report
also stated that the Act's exceptions were intended "to provide protections for consumers by prohibiting the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses where such enforcement would be inequitable." 16' Second, in
its preamble to the Regulation, the Board emphasized that "[lo a large
extent, the exemptions in the Act are extracted directly from the [1976
regulations] in which the exemptions were intended only to apply to
62
borrower-occupants." 1
The Board's arguments are not persuasive. The language of the
Senate Committee Report may well indicate that Congress intended to
protect borrower-occupants of homes in the further encumbrance situation. However, the Report also states that "[a]l loans. . . are subject
63
to" the exceptions to due-on-sale enforcement.
Although limiting the further encumbrance exception to loans
64
made on the security of owner-occupied homes may be justifiable,
the case for restricting the other exceptions to such loans is less appealing. The Senate Committee Report, for example, emphasized that it
would be unfair for lenders to enforce due-on-sale clauses under certain circumstances, such as "involuntary transfers resulting from the
death of a borrower, transfers which rearrange ownership rights within
a family, or transfers resulting from a separation or dissolution of a
marriage."' 65 If it is unfair to enforce a due-on-sale clause when a
marriage dissolution necessitates a title transfer of a family home, is it
less unfair to invoke the clause when the real estate is the family grocery store? If an owner of a family home should be able to transfer it to
an inter vivos trust of which she is the beneficiary, why should her
transfer of raw land held for speculation be treated any differently?
Perhaps the Board would have been wiser to impose the owneroccupant limitation only under the further encumbrance exception.
159.

REPORT OF SEN. COMM. ON BANKING,
REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
REPORT].

S.

HOusING

AND URBAN AFFAIRS ON S. 2879,
SENATE COMMITTEE

[hereinafter cited as

160. Id. at 24.
161. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
162. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,559 (1983).

163.

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note

159, at 25 (emphasis added).

164. See infra text accompanying notes 166-68.
165. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 24.
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Such an approach would have accommodated the Senate Committee's
specific concern for the owner-occupant in the further encumbrance situation, while at the same time deferring in the main to the language of
the Act. In the further encumbrance situation, we believe that lenders
have a legitimate concern that further liens may reduce the mortgagor's
166
economic stake in the real estate to the point of security impairment.
It is true, of course, that certain of the other "non-substantive" or "nonsale" transfers can occasionally threaten mortgage security. 167 Yet we
believe concerns about security impairment, in general, are normally
less justified in most "non-substantive" or "non-sale" transfers than in
68
the further encumbrance setting.
The Regulation modifies the Act's exceptions to due-on-sale enforcement in other respects. For example, the Regulation adds to the
further encumbrance exception by making it clear that a transfer by
installment land contract does not constitute "[t]he creation of a lien or
' 69
other encumbrance subordinate to the lender's security instrument."'
This addition is probably unnecessary because installment land contract transfers almost always entail the transfer of occupancy rights
while, in order for the exception to apply, the Act states that the creation of the lien or encumbrance must "not relate to a transfer of rights
of occupancy in the property." 170 In any event, the Board's interpretation of the exception is correct. The Act's "further encumbrance" exception is aimed at protecting mortgagors who have no intent to sell or
transfer ownership, but want to create non-purchase money junior liens
7
on their real estate for a variety of business or personal reasons.' '
The Regulation, unlike the Act itself,specifies that for certain nonsubstantive transfers to escape due-on-sale enforcement, the transferee
must be a person "who occupies or will occupy the property."'' 7 2 This
requirement is applicable to any transfer resulting from the death of
the borrower, and to transfers to a spouse or child or those incident to
marriage dissolution. 173 For example, if a parent gives his home to a
daughter, and the daughter then occupies it herself, under the Regula166. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23, 62-63.
167. For example, the building that houses a family grocery business may, because of
the death of the original mortgagor, wind up in the hands of an inexperienced and unreliable spouse or child whose actions may result in security impairment.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23, 59-61.
169. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(l)(i)).
170. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d)(l) (1982).
171. See SENATE COMMr'rEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 24. At least one case supports
this conclusion. See Smith v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 649 P.2d 536 (Okla. 1982).
172. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,563 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(l)(v)).
173. Id.
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tion no acceleration may take place. However, if the daughter chooses
to rent it out, the due-on-sale clause is enforceable. There appears to
be no direct support in the legislative history for the Board's addition of
this "transferee occupancy" requirement, and its validity is dubious at
best.
Finally, while the Act prohibits due-on-sale enforcement when
there is "a transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is
and remains a beneficiary" 174 and retains the right of occupancy, the
Regulation conditions this exception on the borrower providing the
lender with "reasonable means acceptable to the lender" by which the
lender will be "assured of timely notice of any subsequent transfer of
the beneficial interest or change in occupancy."' 7 5 Lenders had told
176
the Board that under certain devices, such as the Illinois land trust,
the beneficiary is free to direct the sale of the beneficial interest without
any public record or notice to the lender. 177 The Regulation seems
consistent with congressional intent on this issue as it simply aids the
mortgagee in making future determinations as to whether a "real" or
"substantive" transfer has occurred that would justify invoking the
due-on-sale clause.

The Exemption for Window Period Loans
178
As a result of pressure from the real estate brokerage industry
and a desire to protect the reasonable expectations of borrowers who
believed that they had acquired "assumable" loans for purposes of future resale, 179 Congress provided partial relief from the Act's preemption. Thus, in some states the Act's effect is deferred and state law
continues to govern enforcement of certain due-on-sale clauses. This
was accomplished through creation of "window periods," which give
rise to the postponement of the Act's preemptions. s0 The concept of
window periods is complex, and is not clearly defined in the Act or
susceptible to easy explanation.

174. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d)(8) (1982).
175. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,563 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(1)(vi)).
176. Under such a trust, the trustee (typically a financial institution) holds "bare" legal
title, but has no management duties. See Flaherty, IllinoisLand Trusts and the Due-on-Sale
Clause, 65 ILL. B.J. 376 (1977).
177. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,559 (1983).
178. See supra note 102.
179. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 22.
180. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(I) (1982). States may also extend this window period protection indefinitely. See infra notes 303-09 & accompanying text. The term "window period"
appears in SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 22, rather than in the Act.
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A state may be a window period state if it restricted enforcement
of due-on-sale clauses before the Act. The window period in such a
state began when the state first restricted enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses, and ended when the state ended such restrictions, or upon passage of the Act. Certain loans in a state that had a window period may
remain assumable for three years if they would have been assumable
under state law prior to the passage of the Act. This three-year deferral
period began on October 15, 1982, (the effective date of the Act), and
will continue until October 15, 1985.181 Only states that "prohibited
the exercise of due-on-sale clauses"' 82 before the effective date of the
Act qualify for window period treatment and the three year extension.
To qualify, a state must have prohibited exercise of the due-on-sale
clause by a statute, its constitution, or a decision of its highest court (or
if no such decision, a decision by the state's next highest appellate court
83
whose decisions apply statewide).'
However, not all loans in states qualifying for window period
treatment will remain assumable for this three year period. Only loans
that were "made or assumed" between the date of the state's prohibition of enforcement of the due-on-sale clause and October 15, 1982,
will be governed by state law and thus remain assumable. 84 The Regulation defines "assumed" to include transfers under which a grantee
takes "subject to" the mortgage but does not agree to be personally
1 85
liable for the mortgage debt.
The window period concept can be best understood through factual examples. Suppose State X enacted a statute on July 1, 1979, limiting due-on-sale enforcement in mortgages on single family dwellings to
situations in which the mortgagee can establish impairment of mortgage security. MR purchased his house on September 1, 1980, and simultaneously executed a mortgage on it that contained a due-on-sale
clause. If MR sells his house on April 1, 1984, to Grantee, the mortgage will be assumable by Grantee unless the mortgagee can establish
that the transfer would impair mortgage security. This would also be
true if MR had assumed an existing mortgage on September 1, 1980,
rather than obtaining a new loan, since the assumption would have
occurred after July 1, 1979, the effective date of the state statute. Finally, the transferees of Grantee, if any, will be able to assume the
181. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
182. Id.
183.

Id.

184. Id.
185. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at at 12 C.FR. § 591.2(a)).
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mortgage so long as the transfer takes place prior to October 15, 1985,
and the mortgagee is not able to establish that such a transfer impairs
mortgage security.
Although the Board was requested to identify the states that qualify for window period treatment, it declined to do so i8 6 on the ground
that Congress intended window period determinations to be left to
"state interpretation and state judicial decision."' 187 However, the
Board anticipates that its Office of General Counsel will, from time to
time, issue advisory opinions with respect to state window period

questions. 188
State Law Restrictions That Qualify A State for Window Period Treatment
Only states that have "prohibited the exercise of due-on-sale
clauses"' 8 9 qualify for window period treatment. This language is susceptible to several possible interpretations. If it is taken to refer to total
and absolute prohibitions, no window periods would be created anywhere, as no state bars the enforcement of due-on-clauses under all
circumstances. 90 Such a reading would mean that no post-Act transfers would be exempt from the Act's preemption, even though the
transfers took place in a state that substantially restricts due-on-sale
enforcement. This result would obviously be contrary to congressional
intent. In reliance on language in the Senate Committee Report, 19 1 the
Regulation takes a more moderate view, providing that a state qualifies
for window period treatment when it has "adopted a law. . . prohibiting the unrestricted exercise of due-on-sale clauses upon outright trans92
fers of property."1
186. Id. at 21,555.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
190. See supra text accompany note 48.
191. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 22 (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 170 n.24 (1982)).
192. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p)(2)(i)-(ii)) (emphasis added). The Board expressly refused to identify specific window period states. See id. at
21,555. However, the two major federally-sponsored purchasers of mortgage loans on the
secondary market have attempted to identify such states. The FNMA listed Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Utah, and Washington as "window period" states. See FNMA Press Release, Feb. 22, 1983.
The FHLMC designated the same states as having window periods. The only variation
is the date of commencement of the Arizona period, with the FNMA listing of Mar. 13, 1978
(the date of Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978)), and
the FHLMC listing of July 8, 1971 (the date of Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz.
App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971)). See FreddieMac Issues GuildelinesforDue-on-Sale Enforce-
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The Regulation identifies two specific types of state restrictions
(whether legislative or judicial) that will trigger a window period.
These are restrictions on mortgagee's rights to exercise due-on-sale
clauses when 1) the security or probability of repayment is impaired, or

2) the lender is required to permit a transfer of the property without
raising the interest rate to the current market level. 193 Thus, the Regu-

lation asserts that different or less restrictive state law limitations on
ment, 11 Hous. & DEv. RaP. (BNA) 26 (1983). On the Arizona window period, see generally infra text accompanying notes 253-63.
The Comptroller of the Currency has issued a regulation that includes a state-by-state
list of window periods. See infra note 317 & accompanying text. This list agrees with that of
the FHLMC, except that it adds Arkansas.
Several states not listed by FNMA or FHLMC may have window periods. The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted a rule requiring lenders to show impairment of security in Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972). Subsequent
cases have held that Tucker's restrictions on due-on-sale clause enforcement have been preempted by federal regulation as to savings and loan associations. See First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Myrick, 533 F. Supp. 1041, 1045-46 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Schulte v. Benton Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 279 Ark. 275, 651 S.W.2d 71 (1983); Independence Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Davis, 278 Ark. 387, 646 S.W.2d 336 (1983). However, Tucker still appears to be good
Arkansas law except for federal and state savings associations, and it is unclear why Arkansas was omitted from the FNMA and FHLMC lists.
The Florida district courts of appeals have consistently required a showing of impairment of security for due-on-sale enforcement. See Consolidated Capital Properties, II, Ltd.
v. National Bank of N. Am., 420 So. 2d 618, 622-23 (Fla. App. 1982); Woodcrest Apartments, Ltd. v. IPA Realty Partners, 397 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. App. 1981); First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 S. 2d 156, 159-60 (Fla. App. 1980); see also Turner, Due-onSale Clause: Forcing the Issue, 56 FLA. B.J. 360 (1982). However, there is no Florida
Supreme Court decision. Florida may have been omitted from the FNMA and FHLMC
lists on the supposition that the decisions of the Florida Courts of Appeals are not decisions
which apply State-wide, whatever that phrase from the Act may mean. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 275-91.
It is arguable that Mississippi, although not listed by FNMA and FHLMC, also has a
window period. In Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975), the court refused to enforce
a mortgage clause which prohibited the mortgagor from transferring or encumbering the
property. Id at 64. While the language was not literally a due-on-sale clause, the court
cited with approval several cases restricting due-on-sale enforcement. Id. It held that the
no-transfer clause would be enforceable only upon a showing of increased risk to the mortgagee's security. Id. The opinion surely suggests hostility to due-on-sale clauses, but it is
unclear whether that is enough to create a window period. In terms of reasonable reliance
by mortgagors, it probably is.
The Louisiana situation is even more ambiguous. Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380
So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 1980) refused to enforce a due-on-sale clause, id at 1234, but the
case's impact for window period purposes is unclear because of the presence of several unusual factors: an intermediate appellate court was involved, see infra text accompanying
notes 275-91; the lender actually did not seek acceleration but rather an "assumption fee";
the proposed sale was from one co-owner to another; and a Louisiana statute, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6:837 (West 1951 & Supp. 1983), appeared to authorize savings and loan associations (but not other lenders) to exercise due-on-sale clauses. See Breaux, Due-on-Sale
Litigation, 30 LA. B.J. 18 (1982).
193. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p)(3)).
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enforcement of due-on-sale clauses will not trigger a window period.
For example, even state courts in "automatic enforcement" jurisdictions will not usually enforce due-on-sale clauses when to do so would
be "unconscionable" or "inequitable."'' 9 4 Almost all courts will refuse
to enforce the clauses in non- substantive transfers such as a transfer to
a spouse who becomes a co-owner, a transfer incident to a marriage
dissolution, or a transfer by operation of law upon the death of a joint
tenant. 195 Yet such judicial restrictions probably will not trigger a window period under the Regulation. The Board, in its preamble, offers
the illustration of a state statute that imposes a more onerous foreclosure procedure than the standard procedure used when the default results from the exercise of a due-on-sale clause. 19 6 This type of
restriction, according to the Regulation, will not create a window pe97
riod, and the state statute itself will be preempted by the Act.1
It is doubtful that the Board acted within its power in limiting window periods to states with the two enumerated types of restrictions.
When "non-substantive" or "non-sale" transfers, such as spousal, marriage dissolution, and death transfers are involved, the question has little practical importance. This is because federal law and state law are
likely to have much the same effect. 19 8 But the Iowa statute, which
grants a longer post-sale redemption period when foreclosure results
from due-on-sale enforcement,199 presents a more serious problem. If
Congress intended to preserve the reasonable expectations of mortgagors until 1985, it seems improper for the Board to deny them the benefit of the long redemption period provided by the state statute. In its
desire to aid lenders, the Board may have neglected congressional
intent.
The Regulation also expressly provides that a state with a window
period cannot modify its law to extend the protection from due-on-sale
enforcement to loans that were not of a type protected during the window period. 2°° Thus, in our prior example, 20 ' suppose that on March 1,
1983 (after the effective date of the Act), the state legislature amended
194. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
195. Id.
196. Iowa has such a statute. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 535.8(2)(e) (West Supp. 1983). See
supra note 77.
197. See 48 Fed. Reg. 21,556 (1983) (preamble).
198. See supra notes 59-61 & accompanying text.
199. See supra note 77.
200. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 59 1.2 (p)(1)) (a window
period loan must have been "made or assumed during a window-period created by state law
and subject to that law") (emphasis added).
201. See supra text following note 185.
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its 1979 statute to include mortgages on duplexes within the restriction
on due-on-sale enforcement. Suppose further that MR purchased a duplex that he resold to Grantee in 1984. Mortgagee would be entitled to
accelerate the mortgage debt incident to the transfer to Grantee, even
though no security impairment was shown, because during the window
period state law only affected enforcement of due-on- sale clauses contained in mortgages on single family dwellings. Although the Act itself
does not limit its protection in this way, this result seems sensible in
light of the Act's purpose of protecting the reasonable expectations of
20 2
those who purchased property in reliance on state law.
The Board's position that the window period concept protects only
loans of a type that were protected by state law during the window
period itself is highly significant. It strongly suggests that multiple window periods could exist within the same state, if that state had several
statutes or judicial decisions governing different types of loans at different times. We will return to this point in our analysis of California law
below.
Defining the Window Period-The California Example
In several states it is difficult to tell when the window period begins and what loans it encompasses. We will not attempt to analyze
each state's situation here, but will discuss two of the more interesting
ones: California and Arizona. The California case is especially important, both because California has the largest population of all windowperiod states and because Californians were heavily involved in the
20 3
political negotiation leading to the Act.
An overview of California's pre-Act case law is necessary to understand that state's window period problem. In 1964 the California
Supreme Court, in Coast Bank v. Minderhout,20 4 held that a borrower's
written agreement not to convey certain realty until a loan secured by
the realty was repaid created an equitable lien on the property. The
court upheld the right of the lender to accelerate the debt upon sale of
the property, stating:
In the present case it was not unreasonable for [the lender] to condition its continued extension of credit to the [borrowers] on their retaining their interest in the property that stood as security for the
debt. Accordingly, [the lender] validly provided that it might accel202. Id
203. See Kemper, Spirit of Conciliation Watchwordfor 1982, CALIF. REAL EST., June
1982, at 22 (describing the competing lobbying efforts of California realtors and bankers).
204. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
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20 5
erate the due date if the [borrower]. . .transferred the property.
Coast Bank and two subsequent 1969 court of appeal decisions,
Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings & Loan Association20 6 and Cherry v. Home
Savings & Loan Association,207 were widely interpreted at the time as
placing California in the "automatic enforcement" category.20 8
The California Supreme Court then decided a series of cases that
ultimately reversed this position. In La Sala v. American Savings &
Loan Association,20 9 the court held that a due-on-encumbrance clause
could not be enforced unless the mortgagee could establish that creation of the junior lien impaired mortgage security. The court
concluded:
[Flollowing our ruling upholding reasonable restraints on alienation,
we have distinguished the due-on-sale from the due-on-encumbrance
clause; we have concluded that the lender may insist upon the automatic performance of the due-on-sale clause because such a provision is necessary to the lender's security. We have decided, however,
that the power lodged in the lender by the due-on-encumbrance
clause can claim no such mechanical justification. We sustain it only
in the case of a trial court's finding that it is reasonably necessary to
the protection of the lender's security ....210
In Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association2 11 the court moved
further from Coast Bank, holding that a due-on-sale clause was unenforceable when the borrower sold by an installment land contract
rather than by an "outright sale,"'21 2 unless the lender could establish
that the transfer would impair mortgage security or increase the likelihood of mortgage default. The court emphasized that
in the case of the installment land contract the vendor retains legal
title until the purchase price has been fully paid. Thus in the normal
case the vendor, having received a small down payment and retaining legal title, has a considerable interest in maintaining the property
until the total proceeds under the contract are received; in this he
from the vendor of property where there has been
differs markedly 213
an outright sale.
Interestingly, while the court neither criticized Coast Bank nor mentioned Hellbaum, it expressly disapproved Cherry to the extent that it

205. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
206. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969).
207. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
208. See Tan v. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 3d 800, 807-08, 189
Cal. Rptr. 775, 780-81 (1983).
209. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
210. Id. at 883-84, 489 P.2d 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
211. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
212. Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
213. Id. at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
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was inconsistent with Tucker.2 14
What the Tucker court meant by "outright sale" was far from
clear. In light of its emphasis on the vendor's retained interest, common sense suggests that the court must have defined an "outright sale"
as including only transactions in which the purchaser paid the seller in
cash the difference between the sale price and the mortgage assumedin other words, transactions in which no seller purchase-money financing was involved. Under this reasoning, any type of seller financing,
whether by installment contract, purchase-money mortgage, or
purchase- money deed of trust, would be less than an "outright sale."
As Professor Maxwell has pointed out, however,
common sense must yield to several features of the [Tucker] opinion
itself: the court's frequent references to the installment sale, its assertion that it was dealing only with the installment land contract, and
its statement that "in the case of the installment land contract the
vendor retains legal title until the purchase price has been fully
paid."2 15
Thus, he concluded, "[c]areful reading. . left the possibility that 'outright sale' as used in Tucker meant a transaction in which a conveyance, or a conveyance with a trust deed back to the seller, was
2 16
utilized."
In 1978, the California Supreme Court decided Wellenkamp v.
Bank ofAmerica,2 17 a case involving an institutional lender. The court
held that even in an outright sale situation, only a threat to security or
increased risk of default justified enforcement of a due-on-sale clause.
Unlike Tucker, the Wellenkamp decision unambiguously defined "outright sale" as "any sale by the trustor of property wherein legal title
(and usually possession) is transferred. ' 2 18 The Wellenkamp court "express[ed] no present opinion on the question of whether a private
lender, including the vendor who takes back secondary financing, has
interests which might inherently justify automatic enforcement of a
2 19
due-on clause in his favor on resale."
In the 1979 case of Medovoi v. American Savings & Loan Associa214. Id. at 640, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
215. Maxwell, supra note 9, at 204-05.
216. Id. at 205. Cf. Hetland,After Wellenkamp, PartTwo, CALIF. REAL EsT., Jan. 1979,
at 36, 39 (concluding there is an "overwhelming probability" that Tucker applied to vendor
purchase-money deeds of trust).
217. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
218. Id. at 950, 482 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Reptr. at 383. For a thorough analysis of both
Tucker and Wellenkamp, see Maxwell, supra note 9, at 203-08.
219. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976 n.9, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 385 n.9.
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tion ,220 the California Court of Appeal issued a scathing attack on Welenkamp and construed it as "expressly limited to loans made by
institutional lenders" 22 1 and as applying only when an owner-mortgagor of a "single family residence engages in a voluntary transfer of interest in the secured property to a prospective purchaser. ' 222 The
California Supreme Court denied a hearing, but ordered that the
Medovoi opinion be depublished, 223 thereby depriving it of any prece224
dential value. Subsequently, three other court of appeal decisions
concluded that there was no reason to distinguish between residential
and investment property.
In the 1982 case of Dawn Investment Co. v. Superior Court,225 the
California Supreme Court confronted and decided most of what Wellenkamp had left unresolved. The mortgagee in Dawn was not an institutional lender, but a corporation that had taken a purchase money
deed of trust in a land sale transaction. The court concluded that "no
substantial reason has been shown to treat private lenders differently
than institutional lenders in respect to the restraint on alienation resulting from enforcement of due-on-sale clauses." 226 Further, the court acknowledged that while Wellenkamp did not "show whether the
property there involved was residential or investment property", the
rule of that case was applicable to both types of property. 227 A year
after Dawn, the court of appeal in West v. Buffo 2 28 recognized that "an
individual homeowner falls into a special subclass of private lenders
which was never expressly dealt with in Dawn,' 229 but saw no substantial reason to apply a non-Wellenkamp due-on-sale standard to such
230
lenders.
220. 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979) (depublished).
221. Id. at 581 (depublished).
222. Id. at 580 (depublished).
223. Id. at 572 (depublished).
224. de la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 346-48, 175
Cal. Rptr. 467, 477-78 (1981), rev'd,458 U.S. 141,169 (1982); Panko v. Pan Am. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 920 n.4, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 n.4 (1981), vacated, 458
U.S. 1117 (1982). Apparently, but less clearly, to the same effect was Wilhite v. Callihan,
121 Cal. App. 3d 661,669, 175 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (1981), vacated, 135 Cal. App. 3d 295, 185
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1982).
225. 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982) (decided before the effective
date of the Act).
226. Id. at 702, 639 P.2d at 978, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
227. Id. at 702, 639 P.2d at 978-79, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
228. 139 Cal. App. 3d 93, 98, 188 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537 (1983).
229. Id. at 95, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
230. Id. at 96, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
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The Bank Board'sDeinition of California's Window Period
It is from this interesting and complex web of case law that a California window period or periods must be identified. Under the language of the Act, a window period begins when state law "prohibit[s]
the exercise of due-on- sale clauses." 23 1 However, the Regulation adds
a further gloss, providing that a window period begins when a "state
adopted a law. . . prohibiting the unrestricted exercise of due-on-sale
clauses upon outright transfers of property." 23 2 The phrase "outright
233
transfers" is taken verbatim from the Senate Committee Report.
The Report, in turn, based its definition on language contained in a
footnote in the United States Supreme Court's decision in de la
Cuesta 23 4 that the Court included in the course of its attempt to avoid
retroactive application of the 1976 Regulation. The Court reasoned
that pre-1976 California case law allowed automatic enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses with respect to "outright transfers," and it thus was
unnecessary to confront the retroactivity questions inherent in the 1976
Regulation. 235 Based on this history, the Board concluded that it was
"Congress' intent to extend window-period protection only to assumptions of land-sales contracts after 1978 in California, notwithstanding
the anomalies which might result. 23 6
While the Board's conclusion that the California window period
commences with Wellenkamp has the apparent virtues of simplicity
and ease of application, it is vulnerable to substantial criticism. First, it
suggests that the de la Cuesta Court's assessment of California law
should be dispositive of the window period question. This is inconsistent with the Board's position that Congress intended that window period questions be left to "state determination and state judicial
decision. '2 37 Moreover, the Board's approach seems sharply at odds
with congressional intent to protect those who "relied on state due-onsale restrictions and reasonably believed that they had assumable
loans." 238 A property owner who obtained or assumed a mortgage loan
after Tucker but before Wellenkamp, and who examined the Tucker
231. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
232. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p)(2)) (emphasis
added).
233. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 22.
234. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 n.24 (1982).
235. Id.
236. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,556 (1983). The quoted language is clumsy; it is more apt to say
that the Board believed Congress extended window period protection only to transfers made
after Aug. 25, 1978, even if made by installment contract.
237. See supra text accompanying note 187.
238. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 22.
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opinion, would have expected to be able to resell the property by installment contract without triggering a due-on-sale clause. The Board's
approach does not protect such an owner.
Finally, the Board's approach to the California window period
problem is probably overinclusive in terms of congressional intent. Because of the Board's apparent insistence that a state can have only one
window period, it may, in some situations, afford too much protection
to certain mortgagors. In view of the California Supreme Court's statement in Wellenkamp that it was not deciding whether non-institutional
lenders were subject to its due- on-sale restrictions, it is difficult to see
how a 1979 California purchaser who obtained or assumed a mortgage
loan held by a non-institutional lender could reasonably have thought
that he or she was acquiring an assumable loan. Yet under the Board's
approach, this transaction would apparently be treated as a window
period loan. While the Board's approach has the advantage of simplicity and predictability, it runs afoul of congressional intent by affording
protection to mortgagors and grantees who may not have had reason to
rely on the unenforceability of due-on-sale clauses in their transactions.
Reasonable Reliance andMultiple Window Periods
A better, if more complex, way to determine if a particular mortgage qualifies as a window period loan is to focus on whether the mortgagor or grantee could reasonably have believed, based on the then
current state law and the nature of the transaction, that she was acquiring an assumable mortgage. If so, window period protection should be
available. Admittedly, this "reasonable reliance" approach may result
in separate window periods for different types of mortgage transactions, and will inevitably entail a close analysis of state law. Nevertheless, it is probably most consistent with congressional intent to protect
those who consumated transactions in reliance on state law.
This reasonable reliance approach can be illustrated in the context
of the California due-on-sale case law. Certainly, no window period
could have been created prior to La Sala because a prospective borrower or grantee during that time should have assumed that due-onsale clauses were generally enforceable. 239 Therefore, the requisite detrimental reliance would not have been present. La Sala probably did
not significantly alter reasonable expectations regarding enforceability
of due-on-sale clauses. While the decision restricted enforcement of
due-on-encumbrance clauses, it seemed to reaffirm an automatic en239.

See supra text accompanying notes 204-08.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

forcement approach to due-on-sale situations.2 40
The Tucker decision, which restricted due-on-sale enforcement in
installment land contract transfers to situations involving impairment
of security or increased risk of default, 24' is more troublesome. A relatively weak argument could be made that Tucker created a window
period for all residential tranfers because it expressly disapproved
Cherry, the 1969 court of appeal decision that favored an automatic
enforcement approach. However, Tucker did not mention Hellbaum,
another 1969 court of appeal decision that did not seem to involve facts
significantly different from those in Cherry.2 42 Moreover, the Tucker
court's reasoning in several respects reinforced the impression that dueon-sale clauses would continue to be automatically enforceable in the
"outright sale" setting. 243
As we suggested above, under a reasonable reliance approach
post-Tucker residential installment land contract transfers should have
the benefit of window period protection, the Board's approach notwithstanding. Surely a property owner who obtained a mortgage loan after
Tucker would reasonably have believed that no acceleration could result from resale by an installment contract. On the other hand, postTucker junior purchase-money mortgages and deeds of trust present
serious analytical difficulty. If the "less than outright sale" concept in
Tucker encompassed all transfers in which the seller retained an interest in the mortgaged real estate, then an assuming purchaser whose
seller took back a purchase-money mortgage might be protected by a
window period. If, on the other hand, Professor Maxwell is correct that
Tucker could be read to define "less than outright sale" as encompassing only installment land contract transfers, 244 then Tucker created no
window period for the purchaser whose seller provided financing by
means of a mortgage rather than an installment land contract. Even
though Wellenkamp ultimately defined the outright sale concept
broadly to include all transfers in which legal title is transferred, 245 a
pre-Wellenkamp purchaser could not, based on Tucker, have been rea240. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 211-16.
242. See supra note 214 & accompanying text. However, Cherry, unlike Helbaum, contained language that approved due-on-sale enforcement for interest rate market reasons. To
the extent that the express disapproval of Cherry contained in Tucker indicated a disapproval of the interest rate market motive, it can be argued that Tucker foreshadowed Wellenkamp's rejection of the automatic enforcement approach to due-on-sale clauses in noninstallment land contract transfers.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
245. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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sonably assured of such an interpretation. Consequently, the "reasonable reliance" approach would negate a Tucker window period for all
but installment land contract transactions.
Under the Board's approach, the California window period began
in 1978 with Wellenkamp, since Wellenkamp prohibited the "unrestricted exercise of due-on-sale clauses upon outright transfers of
property." 246 The Wellenkamp window period, in the Board's view, encompasses all lenders whether institutional or private, and all real estate whether residential or commercial. As we have already observed,
the Board seems to conceive of each state as having a single window
period for all types of loans. Yet it is doubtful that this approach is
sound in terms of reasonable reliance by borrowers.
For example, it is unclear from the Wellenkamp opinion whether
its reasoning applied to noninstitutional lenders or to loans on nonresidential properties. 247 The intermediate courts of appeal split on these
questions after Wellenkamp, and even Dawn did not fully resolve
them. 248 We will return to Wellenkamp and Dawn, and will apply the
reasonable reliance theory to them in detail below. 249 The present
point is simply that it is entirely conceivable that borrowers with certain types of loans from certain kinds of lenders might reasonably have
relied on Wellenkamp or Dawn, while others could not have done so. If
this is correct, then we think it inevitable that several different window
periods may exist within California, the Board's contrary view notwithstanding. In principle, the same may be true in other states as well.
A LiteralApplication of the Act to Caiffornia
In view of the complexity and interpretational difficulties of the
reasonable reliance concept and the inherent problems with the Board's
approach, is there an acceptable third alternative for resolving window
period questions? One possibility simply would be to focus on the literal language of the Act. According to the Act, a window period begins
when a "[s]tate adopted. . . [a law] prohibiting the exercise of due-onsale clauses." 25 0 While the word "unrestricted" would necessarily be
inserted before "exercise" to avoid rendering the window period con246. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p)(2). See supra
notes 215-16 & accompanying text.
247. See supra text accompanying note 219. The opinion made no explicit statement as
to whether its rule was restricted to residential properties. See infra note 269.
248. Seesupra text accompanying notes 220-30 and infra note 272 & accompanying text.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 269-74.
250. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(I) (1982).
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cept meaningless, 251 the "outright transfer" language of the Regulation
would be discarded. Thus, in California, since Tucker represented the
first decision by the California Supreme Court that "restricted" dueon-sale (as opposed to due-on-encumbrance) enforcement, mortgages
made or assumed after Tucker would be window period loans. This
would be true whether the lender was institutional or private, the real
estate residential or commercial, or the transfer by deed or installment
land contract.
While such an approach, like the Board's, has the advantage of
simplicity and predictability, it appears to run afoul of congressional
intent by affording protection to mortgagors and grantees who may not
have had reason to rely on the unenforceability of due-on-sale clauses
in their transactions. In California, it would mean that a person who
obtained or assumed a mortgage loan containing a due-on-sale clause
in the interim between Tucker and Wellenkamp would be afforded window period protection, even though he or she may have had no reasonable basis for concluding that the clause would be unenforceable in
other than installment land contract transfers. Thus, this approach unnecessarily violates the general pro-enforcement policy of the Act.
In the last analysis, as the California example demonstrates, there
may simply be no acceptable alternative to the "reasonable reliance"
window period approach. Whatever its difficulties, it is most clearly
consistent with congressional intent. 252
Window Periods in Arizona
Other states also face difficult window period questions. Arizona
confronted the issue before the promulgation of the Regulation, and its
resolution of the problem illustrates the complexity of the window period concept. In the 1971 case of Baltimore Lfe Insurance Co. v.

Ham, 253 the Arizona Court of Appeals held that while due-on-sale
clauses in mortgages were not per se invalid restraints on alienation,
they were enforceable only when the mortgagee's security interest was
threatened or "the purpose of the clause is in some respect being circumvented. '254 The mortgagee in the Ham case was an institutional
lender and the transfer was by deed. However, it is unclear whether
commercial or residential real estate was involved, or whether the court
251. See supra text accompanying notes 189-92.
252. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 22 ("homebuyers who...
relied on state due-on-sale restrictions and reasonably believed they had assumable loans").
253. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971),petitionfor review denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494
P.2d 1322 (1972).
254. Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
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thought these factors significant. Shortly after Ham, Arizona enacted
legislation 255 that applied only to deeds of trust on certain types of residential real estate. The statute prohibited a beneficiary (mortgagee)
from arbitrarily withholding consent from a trustor (mortgagor) to
transfer, and from increasing the interest rate upon a transfer unless the
tranferor was released from liability. 2 56 The interest rate could in no
event be increased by more than one-half of one percent.2 57 InPattonv.
First FederalSavings & Loan Association,258 a 1978 Arizona Supreme
Court decision involving residential real estate and an installment land
contract transfer, the court cited Ham as well as the Arizona statute
with approval and held that due-on-sale clauses in deeds of trust, as
well as in mortgages, were enforceable only when impairment of secur259
ity was established.
In Scappaticciv. Southwest Savings & Loan Association,260 the Arizona Supreme Court held that the "beginning of the window period [in
Arizona] is triggered by [Hamr]" for deeds of trust as well as mortgages. 26 1 Even though Ham was decided by the Arizona Court of Appeals, a lower appellate court, it could be used to mark the beginning of
the window period since that court's decisions have "statewide application. '262 Thus, the Scappaticci court concluded, "[t]o cut off contracts
made prior to Patton but after Ham would render a great injustice to
those borrowers who reasonably believed the due-on-sale clauses were
not enforceable under Ham."263
The court in Scappaticciplainly employed a "reasonable reliance"
approach. Yet in Arizona, as in California, it is easy to disagree as to
what constitutes reasonable reliance. For example, does the Arizona
window period begin with Ham for commercial as well as residential
loans? Borrowers of both types of loans could reasonably have relied
on Harm. What about loans made by non-institutional lenders? Only
institutional financing was involved in Harm (and, for that matter, in
Scappaticci); could vendees who gave installment contracts or
255.

ARz REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-806.01 (West 1974).

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978).
259. Id. at 478-79, 578 P.2d at 157-58.
260. 135 Ariz. 456, 662 P.2d 131 (1983).
261. Id. at 462, 662 P.2d at 136.
262. id. Unless there is an Arizona Supreme Court decision compelling a contrary result, "a decision by one division of the Court of Appeals is persuasive with the other division." Id. See infra notes 276, 284.
263. Scappaticci v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 135 Ariz. at 462, 662 P.2d at 136.
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purchase-money mortgages to their private party vendors reasonably
have relied on Ham? These questions require further analysis.
Subsequent Judicial "Clarification" of Window Periods
The Act and the Regulation prohibit a legislature or court from
expanding the window period. 264 Yet, a later case can always "clarify"

an earlier one. Suppose, for example, that the Arizona Supreme Court
now files an opinion in which it asserts that Harn was meant from the

beginning to apply to all types of loans by all types of lenders. This
would constitute an explanation rather than an expansion. Nonetheless, it is hard to see how such a statement can properly influence the
determination of the window period, at least if reasonable reliance is
the touchstone. After all, a court's later statements about what it meant
earlier are hardly strong evidence of what lawyers or lay people believed its original meaning to be.

This precise issue is raised at least twice by the California cases
described earlier: the Dawn court interpreted Wellenkamp as applying
to non-institutional loans and to non-residential properties, 65 and the
West v. Buffo court interpreted Dawn as applying to mortgagees who
are private parties.2 66 Dawn and West did not focus on the distinction
between clarifying a prior holding and extending a holding to a new
situation, and we do not think that this distinction should matter in
window period determinations. The fact is that both Wellenkamp in
California and Ham in Arizona were unclear as to the precise coverage
of the rules they enunciated. Reasonable people might have read them

narrowly or broadly.2 67

264. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 225-27.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29. We are tempted to add a third example:
Wellenkamp "clarifying" Tucker. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19. But this is
inappropriate, for it is appears clear that the Tucker opinion regarded due-on-sale clauses as
automatically enforceable unless the transfer in question involved vendor financing. See
supra text accompanying notes 211-16. By the time Wellenkamp arose, the court had simply
changed its mind; it stated that, notwithstanding Tucker, "we are now convinced that..."
the clause should be enforced only where security is impaired, even in "outright sales".
Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
Tucker's concept of "outright sales" was being overruled, not clarified.
267. See, e.g., Hetland,After Wellenkamp, CALIF. REAL EST., Dec. 1978, at 40 (asserting
that both nonresidential and residential properties are covered by Wellenkamp, but arguing
for an exemption from Wellenkamp's coverage for at least some types of "private" as opposed to institutional lenders); Zeller, The Due-on Clause after Wellenkamp: Unresoled Issues, 55 CALIF. STATE B.J., Feb. 1980, at 76 (agreeing with Hetland on the coverage of both
residential and nonresidential properties, and arguing for an even broader exemption for
noninstitutional lenders). But see Goodman, The Wellenkamp Decision.- How It Will Affect
RealEstateFinancing, 54 CALIF. STATE B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 34, 40 (arguing that nonresi-
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Determining Window Periods from Ambiguous Judicial DecisionsA Proposal
It is essential that we formulate some workable test for determining whether a rather vague judicial opinion triggers the beginning of a
window period. How then should window period determinations be
made? One possibility is to hark back to the Act's basic objective,
which is to make due-on-sale clauses enforceable. If this premise controls, only borrowers whose claim to reasonable reliance is strong and
clear-cut will be entitled to exemption from the Act's preemptive effect.
But we recommend a contrary approach, on the ground that lay people
(and many real estate agents and lawyers, for that matter) usually have
only a hazy understanding of their state appellate courts' decisions, and
are likely to take newspaper headlines such as "Broad Impact Seen in
Mortgage Ruling" 268 at face value. It would theoretically be possible
for courts to consider the subjective reliance of each individual borrower, but that course is fraught with opportunities for fraud and factual error. It is most sensible simply to assume that borrowers
reasonably relied on the broadest plausible view of the judicial opinion,
protecting the broadest spectrum of loans, except to the extent that the
opinion itself contained specific warnings as to the situations it did not
cover.
The effect of this proposed test can be illustrated by applying it to
the Ham and Wellenkamp cases. The Harn opinion gave no hint as to
whether the court even considered the application of its holding to nonof
residential properties or noninstitutional loans. The same is true 269
Wellenkamp regarding the residential-nonresidential distinction.
Thus, we believe all Arizona borrowers should be given window period
protection from the date of Ham's decision forward. All California
borrowers, whether residential or not, should be protected from the
date of Wellenkamp, if their loans were originated by institutional
lenders.
On the other hand, Wellenkamp mivolved an institutional lender
and the court expressly warned, in a footnote, that it had no view as to
dential properties are outside Wellenkamp's holding, and also that some types of noninstitutional lenders should not be considered within Wellenkamp).
268. L.A. Times, Sept. 9, 1978, § II, at 11, col. 5 (reporting the Wellenkamp decision by
the California Supreme Court). See also Ruling Could Save Home Buyers a Bundle, S.F.
Chron., Nov. 11, 1978, § A, at 8, col. 1.
269. One footnote in Wellenkamp does make reference to preservation of home equities,
but the opinion seems to give the phrase no particular weight. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of
Am., 21 Cal. 3d at 950 n.6, 582 P.2d at 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 84 n.6.
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the Wellenkamp rule's applicability to noninstitutional lenders.270 As
we suggested above, 27 1 it is difficult to see how a borrower from a noninstitutional lender, faced with this language, could reasonably have
expected Wellenkamp to protect her. Such a borrower should have no
window period protection unless she obtained or assumed her loan after Dawn in early 1982, when the court finally made it clear that the
Wellenkamp reasoning applied to noninstitutional loans. Two California Court of Appeal cases had previously held Wellenkamp inapplica272
ble to noninstitutional loans, and a third had held the contrary.
Given this conflict, no borrower could reasonably have relied on the
third case as establishing that noninstitutional loans were covered by
the Wellenkamp rationale.273 Hence, the window period for loans from
non-institutional lenders should commence only with Dawn, and not
274
earlier.
270. Id at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 379 n.9.
271. See supra note 224 & accompanying text.
272. Compare Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 439, 172 Cal. Rptr.
142 (1981), vacated, 30 Cal. 3d 695, 180 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982), and Medovoi v. American
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d 244, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979) (depublished) (dictum
that noninstitutional loans not covered), with Wilhite v. Callihan, 121 Cal. App. 3d 661, 175
Cal. Rptr. 507 (1981), vacated, 135 Cal. App. 3d 295, 185 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1982) (noninstitutional loans covered).
Judge Thompson, concurring in Medovoi, put it well: "Any lender would be unwise
indeed to rely upon any Court of Appeal opinion in this area of the law." 152 Cal. Rptr. at
584 (depublished). The same is true of borrowers.
273. See Columbia Say. & Loan v. Easterlin, 191 N.J. Super. 327, 466 A.2d 968 (1983)
(when two intermediate appellate decisions exist, but seem to conffict with each other, there
is no window period).
274. Two recent California cases disagree. In Lucas v. Jones, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1008,
196 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1983), the California Court of Appeal held that a private loan made
between the dates of Wellenkamp and Dawn was covered by the Wellenkamp rationale,
notwithstanding the language of Wellenkamp's footnote 9, and hence that a window period
for such loans dates from Wellenkamp. The court reasoned that since the Dawn opinion
made no reference to its own retroactivity, the California Supreme Court must have believed
that Wellenkamp covered noninstitutional loans, and that Dawn merely represented the
Court's refusal to create an exception to the Wellenkamp rule. Id at 1011-12, 196 Cal. Rptr.
at 439. This view is apparently supported by another recent case from the court of appeal,
Miranda v. Macias, 141 Cal. App. 3d 188, 191 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1983). The Macias court held
that Dawn was, in effect, retroactive and applicable to a transfer of a noninstitutional loan
made after Wellenkamp and before Dawn. Like the Lucas court, the Macias court held that
the loan was covered by the window period. It apparently assumed that a state can have
only one window period. See supra text accompanying notes 239-49 for our argument to the
,contrary.
This reasoning misses the point. The question is not what the supreme court, four years
after issuing the Wellenkamp opinion, may have thought that opinion meant; rather, it is
whether a borrower or an assuming grantee of a noninstitutional loan who read Wellenkamp
at the time reasonably could have relied on it as making a loan assumable. See supra text
accompanying notes 264-65. In light of the language of Wellenkamp's footnote 9, the answer
to that question is no.
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The Statewide Application Requirement
There are also serious difficulties with the manner in which the Act
permits intermediate appellate court decisions to trigger window periods. We have thus far assumed that decisions of the California Court
of Appeal, for example, are relevant to a window period analysis. 275
This assumption requires examination. The Act allows intermediate
appellate decisions to be used only if the highest state court has rendered no applicable decision, and if the "next highest appellate court
has rendered a decision resulting in a final judgment if such decision
'276
applies State-wide.
By "decision," Congress evidently meant the court-made rule of
law announced by the opinion. But this notion introduces all of the
ambiguities and complexities of stare decisis. For example, did Congress intend to distinguish a "holding," which announces a rule essential to the decision and thus possibly "applies Statewide," from a
dictum that is not required for the decision, is not binding as precedent,
and thus does not "apply" at all, except as a general indication of what
the court might do in a future case? The Act and legislative history
contain no clue. The preamble to the Regulation asserts that dicta cannot start a window period. 277 We suggest, however, that an answer can
be found in the "reasonable reliance" approach used in our earlier
analysis. 278 As a practical matter, lawyers and their clients very often
rely on dicta if it is the best authority available. Dicta should be a
perfectly sound basis for the commencement of a window period, so
long as readers of the opinion could reasonably have relied on it.
A further problem is introduced by the Act's statement that intermediate appellate decisions can be considered only "if the highest court
has not so decided." 27 9 Can this mean that once the highest court has
275. See supra text accompanying notes 248, 266.
276. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982). Congress apparently intended to limit the application of this language to the "unique situation of the State of Michigan." SENATE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 22-23. However, as explained infra at note 284, the Senate
Committee was mistaken in its belief that Michigan appellate decisions have binding rather
than merely persuasive effect on other appellate courts.
The Regulation muddies the statutory language, rewriting it to refer to the appellate
court rendering "a decision resulting in a final judgment which applies statewide." 48 Fed.
Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p)(2)(ii)). Read literally, the Regulation is meaningless, for all judgments by appellate courts apply statewide to the parties who
were before the court. Congress obviously intended to ask whether the rule of law, not the
judgment, has statewide application.
277. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,557 (1983).
278. See supra text accompanying note 238.
279. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
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rendered any decision involving due-on-sale restrictions (as in Wellenkam 2 8o), no future intermediate court decision (as in West 281) has

any relevance? Such a literal interpretation makes little sense. Of
course the highest court's decision controls so far as it goes, but if it
leaves significant questions unanswered, the intermediate courts' decisions can resolve them and by doing so make further law. As to these
unanswered questions, then, the highest court has not "so decided,"
and the intermediate courts' decisions should be considered to initiate
window periods if they otherwise qualify under the Act.
What does it mean for a judicial decision to apply statewide? The
stare decisis effect of intermediate appellate court opinions varies from
state to state. In Arizona, for example, there is only a single intermediate court that may sit in divisions, and a decision by one division is
binding on the others unless the supreme court of the state disagrees.
Such a decision has statewide application, as the Arizona court noted
in Scappaticci.28 2 Perhaps more common is the approach of California,
Florida, and Michigan: one intermediate court's opinions are merely
persuasive and not binding on another court of the same rank.283 Such
opinions are, however, binding on trial level courts throughout the
state, and not merely on those in the district where the appellate court
sits.284

280. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
281. West v. Buffo, 139 Cal. App. 3d 93, 188 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1983).
282. Scappaticci v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 135 Ariz. 456, 662 P.2d 131 (1983)
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 260-63).
283. See, e.g., McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1005,
1017, 140 Cal. Rptr. 168, 176 (1977); Prescod v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.,
57 Cal. App. 3d 29, 39, 127 Cal. Rptr. 540, 546-47 (1976); State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53
(Fla. App. 1976); People v. Plamondon, 64 Mich. App. 413, 426 n.3, 236 N.W.2d 86, 91 n.3
(1975). Some decisions indicate that the divisions of the California Court of Appeal consider themselves bound by a sister court's decision if the California Supreme Court has
denied review. See Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 1194, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 232, 234 (1970); Burns v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 265 Cal. App. 2d 98, 102, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 326, 329 (1968).
284. Auto Equity Sales Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450,455, 369 P.2d 937, 939-40,
20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323-34, (1962); Arentz v. Blackshere, 248 Cal. App. 2d 638, 640, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 809, 810-11 (1967); State v. Hayes, 33 So. 2d 51, 57 (Fla. App. 1976); Matter of Hague,
412 Mich. 532, 552, 315 N.W.2d 524, 532 (1982); Hackett v. Kress, 1 Mich. App. 6, 11, 133
N.W.2d 221, 223 (1965). The Senate Report confuses the matter by apparently referring to
Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977),
as an intermediate appellate decision which applies statewide, and then by asserting in contrast that Florida intermediate appellate decisions do not have statewide effect. SENATE
COMMITTEE REPORT,

supra note 159, at 22-23. The Report appears simply to be wrong; as

the cases above show, intermediate appellate decisions in both Michigan and Florida have
exactly the same effect-binding on trial courts throughout the state, but merely persuasive
to other appellate courts.
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Under this latter approach, should intermediate court decisions be
regarded as applying statewide, in the sense that the Act uses the
phrase? Again, a reasonable reliance analysis is helpful. The window
period concept was designed to protect property owners who reasonably could have expected that an existing rule of law would protect
their right to transfer without acceleration of the debt.285 If a California, Florida, or Michigan intermediate court decision announced such
a rule, even property owners in other districts within the state could
reasonably expect to be protected by it, since if their transactions were
litigated the rule would be binding at the trial level and would have
some persuasive power in the event of appeal. Indeed, the power of
intermediate decisions to bind all state trial courts seems, in itself,
enough to satisfy the Act's test.
Conflicting intermediate appellate decisions, however, present
more difficult problems. Obviously the persuasive power of any one
decision in this context is somewhat limited. Even trial level courts
cannot be bound by contradictory rules, and they ordinarily follow the
view expressed by the appellate court of the district in which they are
located. 28 6 Consider the examples of Florida and California. There is
no Florida Supreme Court due-on-sale decision, but intermediate appellate cases decided in the 1980-1982 period in three of Florida's five
districts consistently adopted an "impairment of security" approach to
due-on-sale enforcement. 287 By contrast, after Wellenkamp several divisions of the California Court of Appeal diverged sharply in their attempts to decide whether the Wellenkamp reasoning applied to
nonresidential mortgages and noninstitutional lenders. 288 Under a
"reasonable reliance" approach, a window period should certainly exist
in Florida from the date of the first of the three cases mentioned. On
the other hand, the earliest California intermediate case after Wellenkamp refused to extend it to nonresidential and noninstitutional situations. 289 The case was depublished, but had it not been, no property
owner could have reasonably relied on the later contrary cases 290 since
a conflict among the districts would have existed.
If, hypothetically, the first intermediate appellate case in California after Wellenkamp had held the rule applicable to nonresidential
and noninstitutional loans, and later appellate cases had disagreed, a
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
See supra cases cited in note 284.
See supra note 192.
See supra note 272.
Medovoi v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979) (depublished).
See supra note 224 & accompanying text.
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more difficult problem would have been created. Again employing a
reasonable reliance analysis, we suggest that in this situation a window
period for such loans would have existed from the date of the initial
decision until the date of the first opinion to conflict with it; a further
window period would then have commenced with the date of the California Supreme Court's opinion in Dawn, 29 1 which would have resolved our postulated conflict among the districts.
The complexity of the foregoing analysis is readily apparent. It is
further evidence that both Congress and the Board have failed to recognize the implications of the window period concept, and have seeded
a fertile field for litigation.
The Effect of the U.C.C.C. on Window Periods
Even legislation restricting due-on-sale enforcement can pose difficulties when used to define window periods, although the difficulties
are more likely to stem from ambiguous content than from questions of
coverage or effective date. Consider section 5.109 of the 1974 version
29 2
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.), adopted in Iowa,
Kansas, 293 and Maine, 294 and in variant forms as part of installment
contract or consumer lending statutes in several other states. 295 This
section, entitled "Default," provides:
An agreement of the parties to a consumer credit transaction with
respect to default on the part of the consumer is enforceable only to
the extent that:
(1) the consumer fails to make a payment as required by agreement;
or
(2) the prospect of payment, performance, or realization of collateral
the prospect of
is significantly impaired; the burden of establishing
296
significant impairment is on the creditor.

It is clear that some types of mortgage loans are included in the
U.C.C.C. definition of "consumer credit transaction. ' 297 Does the lan30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1982).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.5109 (West Supp. 1983).
293. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-5-109 (1981).
294. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 5-109 (1980).
295. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 21(a) (West Supp. 1983); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 408.552 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-179 (Supp. 1982).
296. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.109 (1974) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.].
297. Under U.C.C.C. § 1.301(13) (1974), "consumer credit transaction" includes both a
"consumer credit sale" and a "consumer loan." Both of these, in turn, include credit for
personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes, not exceeding $25,000, payable in instalments. Id. §§ 1301(12)(a)('ii)-(v), (15)(a)(ii)-(iv). If the credit is secured by an interest
in land, the interest rate must exceed 12%. Id. §§ 1.301(12)(b)(ii), (15)(b)(ii). The $25,000
figure is subject to adjustment for inflation under Id. § 1.106. Many second mortgages and
291.

292.
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guage quoted above, when applied to a mortgage loan, "prohibit the
exercise of a due-on-sale clause" and thus trigger a window period? A
technical argument can be made that it does not. Under this view, a
due-on-sale clause has nothing to do with default; rather, its exercise
produces an acceleration of the debt. Whether a default ensues depends
on whether the debtor then fails to pay the accelerated amount, and the
language in the note or mortgage which makes failure to pay a default
is fully enforceable under U.C.C.C. section 5.109(1).
But this interpretation may be too literal. As a practical matter,
the creditor's ultimate sanction underlying a due-on-sale clause is foreclosure. The due-on-sale clause and the clause that makes failure to
pay the accelerated debt a default may be separate in the instrument,
but they are intended to work in tandem. In effect, the due-on-sale
clause is "an agreement. . . with respect to default," as the U.C.C.C.
uses the phrase. This conclusion is buttressed by U.C.C.C. section
5.109(2)'s use of a standard that is strikingly similar to the "impairment
of security" language typically found in judicial opinions that restrict
due-on-sale enforcement.29 8 The U.C.C.C.'s comment uses "insolvency, illegal activity, or an impending removal of assets from the jurisdiction" as illustrations of this impairment. 299 Plainly, a debtor's
transfer of title to real estate collateral, without some further showing,
would not "impair" the "prospect of payment." Thus, the U.C.C.C.
may well be read to prohibit the use of due-on-sale clauses by lenders
as a device for raising interest rates.
We can find no cases or scholarly commentary on this question. It
may not have occurred to the drafters, or might have seemed unimportant to them, since the major focus of the U.C.C.C. is not on real estate
security.3 °0 The matter could be decided either way. In any event the
question is unlikely to be of overwhelming importance. Most of the
real estate loans covered by the U.C.C.C. are probably small, short
term, and carry relatively high interest rates, 30 ' so it is unlikely that
large numbers of real estate purchasers will be interested in assuming
them. Nonetheless, the problem exists and will have to be dealt with.
The Board has consistently maintained that the window period exemption is available only for loans of the type covered by the state law
that created the window period, and that a state cannot extend this prohome improvement mortgage loans are obviously covered by the U.C.C.C. and at least a few
senior purchase-money mortgages as well.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
299. U.C.C.C. § 5.109 comment 2 (1974).
300. See general id. prefatory note.
301. The rate must exceed 12%. See supra note 295.
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tection to borrowers under other types of loans.3 0 2 This position is sensible, but not compelled by the language of the Act. If the courts
conclude that all states with window periods (even periods with minor
impact like those that U.C.C.C. section 5.109 might create) have the
power to expand protection to new types of borrowers, the impact of
the U.C.C.C. provision could be vastly increased.
State Extension of Window Period Protection
If a state has a window period, it may, prior to October 15, 1985,
enact legislation "otherwise regulat[ing]" window period loans
originated by lenders other than certain federally-chartered institutions.30 3 Thus, the legislature in such a state conceivably could insulate
window period loans from the Act's preemption indefinitely. While
this means that such a state may effectively extend preexisting state law
with regard to some loans, it must recognize the power of mortgagees to
use due-on-sale clauses as a tool to ensure that proposed transferees
meet customary credit standards. 3°4 Thus, in no circumstances can a
state absolutely prohibit enforcement of the clause. Since virtually all
state judicial decisions and statutes have recognized the validity of the
clause for the limited purpose of insuring the credit worthiness of proposed transferees, 30 5 the Act is not likely to present a serious conflict
with state law in this respect. Finally, it should be emphasized that
states without window periods may not restrict enforcement of due-onsale clauses.
The exact nature of this authority to "otherwise regulate" certain
window period loans is not clear. Suppose that in 1980 the Supreme
Court of State X held that a due-on-sale clause could not be enforced
with respect to loans on single family dwellings unless the mortagee
could establish that the transfer would impair security or create an in302. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02 and infra text accompanying notes 30607.
303. See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1)(A) (1982). The Senate Committee noted that the
three year period. . . provides State Legislatures. . . with the opportunity to review the impact Due-On-Sale restrictions have imposed. . . on lenders. . . and to
formulate an alternative approach to window period loans if they so desire. For
example. . . a State might repeal existing Due-On-Sale restrictions. A State might
also lengthen the time that State Due-On-Sale restrictions would apply to window
period loans ....
SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 23. The Arizona legislature has exercised
this power, extending the grace period for window-period loans to October 15, 1987. 1983
Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 321 (West).
304. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(2)(A) (1982).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 54-55, 74.
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creased risk of default. State X thus has a window period for mortgage
loans that were made or assumed on such dwellings after the 1980judicial decision. A mortgagor or his tranferee is free to transfer, subject
only to state law restrictions, until October 15, 1985.
Suppose further that during 1984 State X enacted legislation with
a clear intent to insulate such window period loans from the Act's preemption. Assume that the legislation extended this protection to preAct mortgage loans on duplexes made or assumed after the 1980 judicial decision. The time extension is valid, but according to the preamble to the Regulation, the duplex provision is invalid because a state
cannot "expand the type of loan to which the window period applies." 3°6 This seems a justifiable restriction on state legislative action.
If, as was noted earlier, 30 7 a state legislature cannot expand the type of
loan protected from the Act's preemption during the 1982-1985 grace
period, it surely should be unable to do so for the life of the loan.
The Board's interpretation on this point is entirely reasonable.
Unfortunately, the drafting of the relevant portion of the Act was extremely inept. While the Act provides that state legislatures "may
otherwise regulate such contracts, '30 8 it is unclear whether "such contracts" refers to all real property loans except those originated by federally-chartered lenders, or only to window period loans. The latter
construction is more consistent with the Act's overall objective of protecting reasonable reliance, and the Board's view should be upheld.
On the other hand, it appears that legislatures in window period
states have the power to modify the content of existing state law so long
as they do not attempt to extend it to non-window period loans. In the
example above, the legislature could theoretically affect due-on-sale enforcement for window period loans by adopting specific credit standards, either more or less severe than those in the hypothetical 1980
judicial decision, which a prospective grantee would then be required
to meet. As we noted, however, the legislature may not take away the
power of lenders to apply "customary credit standards." 30 9 In light of
this limitation, the practical ability of legislatures to change credit standards is unidirectional: they may only impose standards stiffer than
"customary" standards.
A more significant possibility for change lies in the area of foreclosure procedure. It seems fully within the power of a window period
306. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,558 (1983).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
308. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(2)(A) (1982).
309. See supra text accompanying note 304.
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state's legislature to adopt a new foreclosure process, either more or less
burdensome to lenders than the standard procedure, for defaults triggered by due-on-sale clauses.
Window Periods--Conclusion
The mind-boggling complexity and ambiguity of the window period concept in practice illustrates how unwise it is to make broad national policy turn on the date that a particular court-made rule became
law or on the precise coverage of the rule; such judicial law-making is
not well suited to achieve Congress' goals. When legislation such as
the U.C.C.C. is involved, questions of scope of coverage and effective
date are usually easier to answer, for the statute will often be quite
explicit on these points. But even a statute's interpretation may be
open to doubt and may confound Congress' intent.
The Board's apparent refusal to recognize reasonable reliance as
the key to interpretation of the window period principles is equally
troubling. By pretending that there is only one window period for all
types of loans and lenders in a given state, it has sacrificed common
sense for administrative simplicity. Even the simplicity is illusory, for
the Regulation is certain to be attacked in court as contrary to the intent of Congress. The combined result of Congress' flawed conception
and the Board's faulty execution will be a mountain of litigation.
Special Rules Under the Act for Certain Federally-Chartered
Lenders
As noted earlier, federally-chartered savings and loan associations
have had the pre-Act power to enforce due-on sale clauses by virtue of
the 1976 Bank Board regulation upheld in de la Cuesta.310 The Act,
with minor modifications, simply continues that power. 3 1 Moreover,
while prior to the Act some doubt existed as to the enforceability of
due-on-sale clauses in pre-1976 regulation mortgage loans, the Act's
preemption definitely applies to such clauses, which are now clearly
enforceable. 312 Neither the window period concept nor a window period state's ability to "otherwise regulate" window period loans is applicable to such federal associations. 3 13 Thus, so far as any post-Act
310. See supra text accompanying notes 89-100.
311. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(2)(C) (1982). The Act's modifications involve transfers
which are exempt from due-on-sale enforcement. See supra text accompanying notes 83,
152.
312. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(1), (c)(2)(C) (1982).
313. Id. § 1701j-3(c)(2)(C).
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transfer is concerned, federal associations are entirely free of state dueon-sale law.
With respect to national banks and federal credit unions, window
period loans originated by these lenders are subject to state law until
October 15, 1985, 3 14 unless the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) or the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) acts
prior to that date otherwise to regulate these loans. 3 15 Thus, the Comptroller or the NCUA has the power to either extend or contract the time
period in which these loans are subject to state law. The NCUA acted,
effective November 18, 1982, to render immediately enforceable dueon-sale clauses in transfers made on or after that date.3 16 In effect, the
NCUA's rules preempt state law, regardless of the reasonable expectations of the consumers in states that would otherwise have had assumable window period loans.
The Comptroller's rule, effective December 8, 1983, is similar to
the NCUA rule but is more lenient to owners of one to four family
homes who obtained or assumed loans during a window period. Until
April 15, 1984, such loans can be assumed to the extent allowed by
state law, except that the lender may increase the interest rate to a
"blended" level that is the average of the original contract rate and the
current average contract interest rate on existing homes, as published
by the Board. For other types of loans, the full federal preemption is
3 17
effective immediately.
Prepayment Penalties Incident to Due-on-Sale Enforcement
Under the Act
Mortgagees frequently include in loan agreements a provision that
exacts a fee or "prepayment penalty" for the "privilege" of prepaying a
mortgage loan. While the amount of the penalty varies, a common
amount is six months' interest.3 18 Such prepayment penalties are uti314. Id. § 1701j-3(c)(1)(B).
315. Id.
316. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,425 (1982) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6 (d)(2)(i)).
317. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,283 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 30.1). The Comptroller
took the unprecedented step of expressly designating, for purposes of his regulation, the
window period for each state. See supra note 192.
The Comptroller's use of "blended" rates is supported by the Act, which specifically
encourages the use of such rates. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(3) (1982). The Board, believing this
provision to be merely persuasive and not mandatory, did not include a similar provision in
the Regulation. See 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561-63 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 591.1-.6).
318. A Board regulation, applicable to all federally chartered savings and loan associations, limits the penalty for payment of the entire principal balance to a maximum of six
months' interest. This regulation also permits penalty-free prepayment of up to 20% of the
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lized for at least two reasons. First, it is argued that the mortgagee's
fixed costs of making a loan are not recaptured entirely if the loan is
terminated early. The collection of a prepayment penalty is aimed at
enabling the mortgagee to recapture these costs. 319 Second, such pro320
visions are utilized as a complement to the due-on-sale clause.
While the due-on-sale clause enables a mortgagee to recall lower-thanmarket-interest-rate loans, the prepayment penalty is utilized to discourage mortgagor refinancing when market interest rates fall below
the rate being collected by the mortgagee on an existing loan.
While judicial attacks on prepayment penalties have largely been
unsuccessful, 321 state legislation and federal regulation limit such penalties in a variety of residential mortgage settings. 322 There has also
been some success in challenging collection of the penalty when prepayment was triggered by an involuntary disposition of the mortgage
security, such as by casualty loss or condemnation. 323 Moreover, courts
have at times been reluctant to permit the collection of a prepayment
mortgage balance in any twelve month period. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-5(b) (1983); see also
Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 23 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 417 (1971); Note, Secured Real Estate Loan Prepayment and the Prepayment Penalty,
51 CALIF. L. REV. 923, 925 n.14 (1963).
319. See, e.g., Bonanno, supra note 9, at 295.
320. See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 6.1.
321. See, e.g., Meyers v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 38 Cal App. 3d 544, 546, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 358,359 (1974); Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 303, 311, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417,422 (1971); Aronoffv. Western Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
28 Colo. App. 151, 155, 470 P.2d 889, 891 (1970).
322. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5512 (1981) (prohibiting any prepayment penalty
in excess of 1.5% of the prepayment); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 438.31c (West 1978) (a
penalty may not be imposed after three years from the date of the mortgage and any charges
within that three year period are limited to one percent of the amount of any prepayment);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.036 (Vernon 1979) (imposition of prepayment penalties prohibited
after five years from the date of the execution of the loan); N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:10B-2 to -3
(West Supp. 1982) (amount of any prepayment penalty is reduced each year during the first
three years of a mortgage loan; no prepayment may be collected thereafter); N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 393(2) (McKinney 1971) (prepayment penalties may be imposed only during the first
year of the loan and may not exceed interest for a period of three months on the principal so
prepaid, or interest for the remaining months in the first year, whichever is the lesser
amount).
As noted earlier, the Board also restricts prepayment penalties. See supra note 318.
The FNMA does not enforce prepayment clauses in mortgages it owns, and its 1980 mortgage form does not include a prepayment penalty provision. See FNMA Conventional
Home Mortgage Selling Contract Supplement § 301.05. The FHLMC prohibits the collection of a prepayment charge on any mortgage acquired by it in 1980 and thereafter. See
FHLMC SELLER'S GUIDE CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGES § 3.201(e).
323. See, e.g., Associated Schools, Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. App.
1968); Silverman v. State, 48 A.D.2d 418, 414, 370 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236 (1975); Sala v. Berkeley Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 104 N.J. Super. 394, 400, 250 A.2d 150, 154 (1969); Chestnut Corp.
v. Bankers Bond & Mortgage Co., 395 Pa. 153, 156, 149 A.2d 48, 50 (1959).
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penalty incident to a default on the mortgage indebtedness and foreclosure. This reluctance is sometimes justified on the theory that when
default in payment of the indebtedness occurs and there is an acceleration, no prepayment, as such, can take place. At that stage, the mortgagor cannot opt to prepay, but only to exercise his equity of redemption
324
from the mortgage.
The Act itself is silent concerning collection of prepayment penalties incident to due-on-sale enforcement. The Board has vascillated in
its regulatory approach. Its proposed Regulation, issued in January of
1983, would have prohibited all lenders from collecting prepayment
325
penalties resulting from acceleration under due-on-sale clauses.
However, the final Regulation, issued in April of 1983, backed away
from this position and prohibited assessment of penalties only as to
loans originated by federally-chartered savings and loan associations
between July 31, 1976, and May 10, 1983.326 As to all other loans the
Board chose not to restrict prepayment penalties, but rather to leave the
327
matter to state law.
This result was confusing to many lenders, since in most states
there was no clear state law. The Board received numerous requests
for clarification, and on July 7, 1983, it reverted to its original proposal;
the Regulation was amended to prohibit all prepayment penalties in
connection with due-on-sale enforcement. 3 28 This step eliminated the
discrimination between federal and state-chartered lenders and probably forestalled considerable litigation.
Yet there is no language in the Act that gives the Board authority
to extend the prepayment penalty prohibition to state lenders. The
Board relied on a statement in the Senate Report that referred to the
need for uniform, homogeneous mortgage documents in the operation
of an efficient secondary mortgage market. 329 While it is hard to quarrel with this goal, it is also hard to see how this rather ambiguous and
insubstantial statement can authorize Board action that changes a type
of mortgage clause never mentioned in the Act. Lenders are likely to
attack the amended Regulation as ultra vires, and they may well
succeed.
The validity of the Board's attempted preemption of the prepay324. See George H. Nutman, Inc. v. Aetna Business Credit Inc., 115 Misc. 2d 168, 453
N.Y.S.2d 586 (1982); OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 376.
325. 48 Fed. Reg. 2,378 (1983).
326. Id. at 21,563 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2)).
327. Id. See also id. at 21,560.
328. Id. at 32,160 (amending 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2)).
329.

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 21.
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ment penalties issue may not have much practical importance. State
law consistently has been unsympathetic to this type of "double-dipping." A few state statutes prohibit the enforcement of a prepayment
penalty if the prepayment is triggered by the mortgagee's enforcement
of a due-on-sale clause. 330 Several courts have reached the same result
without the benefit of a statute. These cases reason that once a mortgagor has exercised the due-on-sale clause and accelerated the mortgage
is then legally due and by definition
debt, payment by the mortgagor
'331
"prepayment.
a
be
cannot
This result is sound from a policy perspective as well. As the
Board has pointed out, "[w]hile the ability to impose a prepayment or
equivalent fee upon due-on-sale acceleration may be of some economic
benefit to the lender, it is in no sense essential to effective use of the
due-on-sale clause for the purpose of raising portfolio yields to current
market rates. '332 Moreover, neither of the two reasons normally used
to justify prepayment penalty provisions justify their use incident to
due-on-sale enforcement. First, collection of the penalty is not, in this
context, needed to "lock in" a loan that earns a higher than market
interest rate. Except in the relatively rare situation in which the dueon-sale clause is invoked to prevent impairment of security, it is used
when current market interest rates exceeed the rate being paid by the
mortgagor- transferor and any rational mortgagee would be only too
delighted to accept a prepayment. Further, while any prepayment of
the loan principal without collection of the penalty may frustrate the
mortgagee's ability to recover fully the fixed cost of making the loan,
such an argument is hardly persuasive when, in the due-on-sale context, it is the mortgagee rather than the mortgagor who is insisting on
prepayment.
Mortgagee's Duty to Respond Under the Act
When a mortgagor and a proposed transferee seek mortgagee approval for a transfer of a window-period loan, the Regulation requires
the mortgagee to respond in writing with its decision within thirty days
after receipt of a completed credit application and supporting informa330. See, e.g., N.Y. REL PROPERTY LAW § 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1982); VA. CODE

§ 6.1-330.33 (1983).
331. See, e.g., Tan v. California Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 3d 800, 809, 189
Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (1983); American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mid-America Serv. Corp.,
329 N.W.2d 124, 125-26 (S.D. 1983); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 21,560 (1983) (citing Slevin
Container Corp. v. Provident Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 Ill. App. 3d 646, 648, 424 N.E.2d
939, 94 (1981)).
332. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,560 (1983).
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tion. 333 If the mortgagee decides to disapprove a proposed transfer, its
decision must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons supporting
the disapproval.3 34 Failure to respond in this way prohibits a mortga335
gee from enforcing a due-on-sale clause as to the proposed transfer.
The foregoing requirements are apparently inapplicable to non-window period loans and to all loans originated by federally-chartered savings and loan associations.3 36 Perhaps this exclusion was based on a
Board belief that since the due-on-sale clauses in such loans are usually
enforceable, the mortgagor and his or her transferee should be deemed
to assume that permission to transfer will be denied. Thus, the Board
could have concluded that the imposition of a formal response requirement on the mortgagee under such circumstances would not be
justifiable.
This limitation of the response requirement to window period
loans whose due-on-sale clauses are likely to be unenforceable is unfortunate. To be sure, the probability of obtaining permission to transfer
may be significantly lower in circumstances involving a non-window
period loan. On the other hand, there may well be instances when a
mortgagee will permit a transfer with no interest rate change, notwithstanding the enforceability of the due-on-sale clause. This could occur,
for example, if the current market rate does not differ markedly from
the mortgage rate. It is common for lenders to approve transfers on the
condition that the interest rate be raised to a "blended" level somewhere between the original and current market rates. The Senate Report and the Act itself specifically encourage this practice. 337 In any
event, it hardly seems equitable to leave the parties to a proposed transfer in a state of uncertainty for an unduly long period. This is espe333. Id. at 21,562 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.4(d)(3)).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. The language of 12 C.F.R. § 592A(d)(3) does not specifically exempt non-window
period loans and all loans originated by federally-chartered savings and loan associations
from the formal mortgagee response requirement. But when it is read in context with other
parts of 12 C.F.R. § 591.4, an inference that the Board intended such an exclusion is strongly
warranted. For example, the section itself is entitled "Loans originated by lenders other
than Federal associations." Moreover, 12 C.F.R. § 591.4(d)(2), which immediately preceeds
the formal response requirement, deals specifically with the circumstances under which a
transfer of a windowperiodloan may be denied when the transferee does not meet the mortgagee's customary credit standards. In this context it is unlikely that the Board could have
intended to apply 12 C.F.R. § 591.4(d)(3) to non-window period loans or to those loans
originated by federally-chartered lenders.
337. See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(3) (1982); SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159,
at 21.
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cially true where, as here, the response requirement appears to impose
a relatively insignificant burden on the mortgagee.
In certain relatively rare situations, a mortgagee may by judicial
decision be held estopped to assert, or to have waived, its rights under
an otherwise enforceable due-on-sale clause? 38 Suppose a mortgagor
requests permission to transfer and receives no reply from the mortgagee. Nonetheless, the proposed transfer is consummated. If the mortgagee delays acceleration of the mortgage debt for a significant period
of time, a court may be convinced that any subsequent attempt to enforce the clause as to that transfer is barred by waiver or estoppel principles. The probability of this result will be increased if the transferee
has made significant improvements to the mortgaged real estate or has
entered into substantial commercial relationships with respect to that
real estate, prior to a belated attempt by the mortgagee to accelerate the
mortgage debt. Unfortunately, the judicial application of waiver or estoppel concepts in this setting is uncertain at best. Ideally, the Board
should simply broaden the lender-response requirement to encompass
loans that contain enforceable due-on-sale clauses.
The Board's authority to take this step is debatable. The Act contains nothing about lender response. It merely states that lenders of
window period loans may insist that transferees meet customary credit
standards. 339 The Board apparently reasoned from this provision that
it had authority to standardize the procedure by which the meeting of
applicable credit standards would be determined and communicated.
This conclusion seems unexceptionable. Of course, the Board's plenary
power to regulate federally chartered associations 340 would permit it to
apply this rule to such lenders with respect to all loans originated by
them. A harder case would arise if the Board attempted to make nonfederally chartered lenders comply with the response rule for non-window period loans. On the one hand, the Act provides that the power of
such lenders to enforce their due-on-sale clauses "shall be exclusively
governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies
338. The cases frequently focus on whether the lender has delayed an unreasonable time
after the transfer before accelerating. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
181 Colo. 294, 304, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245-46 (1973) (one-month delay is reasonable, but one
year would not be); First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 90 Il. App. 3d 215, 219, 412 N.E.2d 1078,
1082 (1980) (18-month delay gave rise to estoppel where mortgagee had notice and mortgagor detrimentally relied). Cf. Bakker v. Empire Sav., Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 634 P.2d 1021,
1022 (Colo. App. 1981) (no waiver despite lender's acceptance of payments after notice of
transfer); Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 384 Mass. 63, 67, 423 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (1981) (three
month delay, no waiver or estoppel).
339. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(2)(A) (1982).
340. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982).

November 1983]

DUE-ON-SALE PREEMPTION

of the lender and the borrower shall be fixed and governed by the contract."'34 1 This language may prevent the Board from interposing even
mere procedural requirements if they are not mentioned in the loan
contract.
On the other hand, the Act gives the Board authority "to issue
rules and regulations and to publish interpretations governing the implementation of this section." 342 The grammatical structure of this sentence seems to suggest that issuing rules and publishing interpretations
are separate activities, and this in turn may indicate that rules can be
issued that go beyond mere interpretations of the Act. Under this view,
a rule giving non-window period borrowers a right to a timely response
to their requests for loan assumption approval might well be within the
Board's powers. At least, such a rule is well within the general subject
matter of the Act, something that cannot be so easily said about the
Board's rule on prepayment penalties.
Further support for this position is found in the Act's language,
appearing at the end of the list of "non-substantive transfers" discussed
earlier in this article, 343 that prohibits due-on-sale enforcement upon
"any other transfer or disposition described in regulations prescribed
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board."'344 The Senate Committee
Report indicates that the Board was given this authority "to provide
protections for consumers by prohibiting the enforcement of due-onsale clauses where such enforcement would be inequitable." 345 Since it
is probably inequitable for a lender to accelerate after failing to give a
timely response to the borrower's request for approval to transfer title,
this language seems to fit the present situation rather nicely. It seems
very likely that if the Board issued a broad rule requiring all lenders to
respond to such requests within a reasonable time, the courts would
uphold it.
Release of The Original Mortgagor Under the Act
When a mortgagee waives its right to accelerate under a due-onsale clause (typically after a higher interest rate or "assumption fee" is
agreed upon)
and the transferee assumes (rather than merely takes
"subject to" 346) the existing mortgage, the Regulation requires that the
341. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(2) (1982).
342. Id. § 1701j-3(e)(1).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
344. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d)(9) (1982).
345. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 25.
346. A grantee who "assumes" an existing mortgage becomes personally liable for the
payment of the mortgage debt. A grantee who merely takes "subject to" the mortgage im-
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mortgagee release the original mortgagor from personal liability on the
mortgage debt.347 For several years this requirement has been part of

Board regulations applicable to federally-chartered savings and loan
associations.

348

The mortgage form specified for use by lenders who

sell mortgages to the FNMA and the FHLMC on the secondary market
also imposes such a requirement on mortgagees. 349 There is no policy
ground for objecting to the Board's requirement, but there is also no
justification for it in the Act. Hence the Board's authority to impose
the requirement on lenders other than federally-chartered savings associations must rest on the rather thin reed of its general power to issue
rules. 350

Concealment of Transfers
In jurisdictions where due-on-sale clauses have been automatically
enforceable or where there has been some doubt as to their enforceability, parties to real estate transactions may be tempted to avoid the consequences of the due-on-sale clause by concealing the transfer from the
mortgagee. Because the Act will increase the number of enforceable
due-on-sale clauses, these concealment attempts will probably increase.
For example, to decrease the risk of discovery, the parties may arrange
to have the transferee make the mortgage payments to the mortgagortransferor or to a third party, who in turn will make the payment to the
mortgagee in the mortgagor's name. Usually the parties continue to
use the payment book originally issued to the mortgagor-transferor.
For a variety of reasons these concealment strategies often fail.
Some mortgagees, for example, may closely monitor the public records
for evidence of new real estate recordings affecting their mortgaged
properties. Ownership changes may also become apparent from the
annual real estate tax statements that the mortgagee receives in its capacity as an escrow agent for real estate taxes and insurance. Similar
information can be obtained when a new casualty insurance policy is
issued and the mortgagee's copy reveals the new owner. Moreover,
plicitly agrees that if the debt is not paid the mortgagee may look to the mortgaged real
estate for satisfaction of the debt, but the grantee does not become personally liable on that
debt. See, e.g., Del Rio Loan, Inc. v. Haument, 110 Ariz. 7, 9, 514 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1973);
Elluckson v. Dull, 34 Colo. App. 25, 28,521 P.2d 1282, 1284 (1974); Brice v. Griffin, 269 Md.
558, 561, 307 A.2d 660, 661 (1973); Nutz v. Sheperd, 490 S.W.2d 366, 372 (Mo. App. 1973).
347. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,563 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(3)).
348. 12 C.F.R. § 5 45.8- 3 (g) (1983).
349. FNMA/FHLMC Mortgage, supra note 2, Clause 17 (one to four family).
350. See supra text accompanying note 342.
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mortgagees can keep abreast of transfers through a program of regular
inspection of the real estate on which they hold mortgages.
Transferees may attempt to reduce the chances of discovery by not
recording the transfer. This approach not only frustrates mortgagee
discovery of the transfer from an examination of the public records, but
also usually prevents the revelation of a new owner incident to the issuance of new tax statements. In addition, the parties may also keep the
casualty insurance policy in force in the mortgagor's name, but utilize a
side agreement that purports to assign the beneficial interest in the policy to the transferee.
Even assuming that the foregoing tactics succeed in preventing
mortgagee discovery of a transfer, the failure to record can create substantial problems for transferees in some states. If the transferee takes
possession, in most jurisdictions that constitutes constructive notice of
the transferee's interest and should protect the transferee against mortgages or other interests that are created by or arise against the mortgagor-transferor. 35 ' In such situations, possession is the functional
equivalent of recording. 352 A few jurisdictions, however, require actual
353
notice; possession alone does not qualify as constructive notice.
Even when possession constitutes constructive notice, "establishing the
existence of that possession could require litigation, while the fact of a
recorded document would not."'354 Failure to record is unacceptably
risky, in our view.
If the mortgagee ultimately discovers the transfer, as will often
happen, does it have a remedy against the parties to the concealment
beyond a belated acceleration of the mortgage debt? The answer will
depend in part on whether the parties have a duty to notify the mortgagee of the transfer. One court suggested that no such duty is implicit in
the due-on-sale clause itself.355 This conclusion is by no means inescapable. A court could conceivably impose a duty of good faith on the
mortgagor that would be violated by concealment attempts. Moreover,
some mortgagees have begun to include express mortgage language
that requires the mortgagor-transferor to notify the mortgagee in the
event of a transfer. When such language is utilized, the mortgagee may
351. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 124, at 194-95.
352. See McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir. 1982); Grand Island Hotel
Corp. v. Second Island Dev. Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253, 257 (1974).
353. See, e.g., Drey v. Doyle, 99 Mo. 459, 469, 12 S.W. 287, 289 (1889); MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 183, § 4 (West 1982); Comment, Possession as Notice Under MissouriRecording
Act, 16 Mo. L. REv. 142 (1951).
354. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 102.
355. Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979) (depublished).
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have a cause of action even when a window period loan is involved.
Even though the due-on-sale clause in such a loan will often prove to
be unenforceable, the mortgagee has a valid interest in discovering the
identity of the transferee so as to be able to assess his or her
creditworthiness or the impact of the transfer on mortgage security.
Suppose there is a duty to notify the lender, or at least a duty of
good faith that would be violated by active concealment efforts. What
damages might the lender recover for breach? If the mortgagee had
been informed at the time of the transfer and had accelerated, and if
the funds could have then been re-lent at a higher rate, the mortgagee
has lost this interest income. In reality, most lenders are willing to
forego acceleration under due-on-sale clauses in a rising-interest market if the transferee agrees to begin paying an interest rate that is higher
than that provided in the original contract but nearer to the current
market rate. In a concealment case the mortgagee might show damages
by proving the interest rate that it customarily demanded on transferred properties at the time the concealed transfer occurred. It is
doubtful that punitive damages could be recovered even for bad faith
on the mortgagor's part.356 It would appear that only the original
mortgagor can be liable for compensatory damages; the transferee who
has taken subject to a mortgage has no contractual relationship with
the lender, and it is hard to see any other basis for liability.
Concealment can raise serious legal problems between the mortgagor and the transferee. If the lender subsequently discovers the tranfer
and accelerates, the transferee may well sue his seller for damages. The
suit could claim, for example, a breach of an implied warranty or covenant that the loan would not be called due. We have found no case
authority for such an action, but it is not inconceivable. This implied
covenant notion is, in a sense, the exact opposite of the traditional implied covenant of marketable title, 35 7 for here a continuing encumbrance is desired by the buyer and bargained for by the parties. The
buyer would argue that acceleration by the lender breaches this term
and understanding of the sales agreement. The buyer's damages would
represent the excess interest (and possibly settlement and related costs)
that the buyer would incur in the future upon refinancing the property
after acceleration. Moreover, if the buyer is unable to qualify for new
356. Punitive damages are not generally available for contract breaches unless a tort has
also been committed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 355 (1981); 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 35, § 1077.
357. See 6A R. POWELL, supra note 118, at 925(2); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 119, § 11.47.
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financing and foreclosure ensues, the seller may be liable for damages
incident to the buyer's loss of his or her equity in the mortgaged real
estate. Conceivably the seller could be faced with two suits: one by the
lender for lost interest up to the date of actual acceleration, and one by
the buyer for increased interest payments or loss of the property thereafter. In any transaction in which the lender is not fully informed, the
seller is well-advised to include in the sale contract language by which
agrees
the transferee acknowledges the risk of future acceleration and
358
to hold the seller harmless in the event acceleration occurs.
Should a lawyer be troubled by the ethical implications of counseling a client to conceal a transfer, or of arranging the details of the
transaction? At most, the concealment is a breach of contract, and the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility apparently does not prohibit advising a client to breach a contract, although Disciplinary Rule
client
7-102(A)(7) provides that a lawyer shall not "counsel or assist his'359
Of
in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
course, "illegal" is a slippery word, and could conceivably include contract breaches. But the opinons of the American Bar Association's
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility consistently treat
this rule as referring only to criminal conduct or something very close
to it.360 The rule has never been regarded as applying to breaches of
contract.
The lawyer who counsels concealment in the face of an enforceable due-on-sale clause may be (and we think usually is) guilty of giving
poor advice, but it does not appear to be an ethical violation under the
Code. We are uncomfortable with this conclusion. The Code does not
societal
adequately deal with the issue, and perhaps reflects the larger
3 61
indecision regarding the morality of breaching contracts.

Conclusion
Congressional preemption of due-on-sale clauses under the Act
can be evaluated on two levels: whether the Act's objective is sound,
and whether it can accomplish the objective in a satisfactory manner.
358. See Liss, Drafting Around the Mortgage "Due on Sale" Clause in the Installment
Sale ofReal Estate, 62 CHI. B. REC. 312 (1981) (suggesting various other protective clauses).
359. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1980) states the same
priciples in even more general terms.
360. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314
(1975) (perjury by client); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 335 (1974) (securities fraud); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 281 (1952) (representation of a criminal syndicate).
361. Liss, supra note 358, appears to see no ethical problems in concealment. Id. at 312.
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On the first level, we have no difficulty applauding the Act. A
uniform national policy enforcing due-on-sale clauses was long overdue. The arguments that have been raised against enforceability of
due-on-sale clauses as interest rate adjustment tools do not appear to us
to be logical. As the mortgage finance market has evolved, the arguments seem even less persuasive, even if one ignores the grave economic crisis that depository financial institutions have weathered.3 62 In
an era when short-term balloon mortgages and adjustable rate loans
have become common, the latter with rate adjustments perhaps every
six months or every year, we believe it does not make sense to regard
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause as unconscionable. From the
borrower's viewpoint, a fixed-rate long-term mortgage with a due-onsale clause is usually much more humane and agreeable than a shortterm rollover loan or a frequently-adjusted variable interest mortgage.
With the former, the borrower is at least assured that the rate will be
stable so long as he or she owns the property. When one considers the
general decline in the use of prepayment penalties in the past few years,
the fixed-rate loan with a due-on-sale clause often gives the borrower
the best of all available worlds-protection against rising rates, and at
the same time, freedom to refinance if rates fall-so long as the property is not transferred. Of course, the contract is not as advantageous
as it would be if continued restrictions on enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses made the loan transferrable at its existing contract rate. However, compared to the alternative kinds of contracts that have become
popular without so much as a wimper of protest from the courts, it is
very attractive.
The restraint on alienation argument has always been, in our opinion, a weak one. Those who have pressed it have usually managed to
avoid direct discussion of its major premise: that mortgage lenders
somehow have an obligation to finance not only the ownership of their
immediate borrowers, but of the transferees of those borrowers as well.
If one accepts this premise, then it is true that the due-on-sale clause is
362. The impact of decisions restricting due-on-sale enforcement on the well-being of
financial institutions has been substantial. One economist has estimated that the effect of the
Wellenkamp decision, supra note 217, in calendar year 1981 was to transfer between $58
million and $170 million from California state-chartered savings and loan associations to
borrowers. Ozanne, The FinancialStakes in Due-on-Sale: The Case of California's State
ChareredSavings and Loans 2 (unpublished paper prepared for the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, July 1982).
Another study estimated that Wellenkamp reduced the market value of the mortgage
portfolios of California-chartered associations by an amount equal to about 45% of the associations' net worth. See Dietrich, Langetieg, Dale-Johnson & Campbell, The Economic
Effects of Due-on-Sale Clause Invalidation, 2 HOUSING FIN. REV. 19 (1983).
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a practical restraint on alienation. On the other hand, if lenders have
no such duty then their insistence on being paid off when the borrower
sells the property, or on extending the loan only at a higher interest
rate, cannot be thought to restrain the sale, any more than would the
refusal of some other lending institution to finance the new owner's
purchase. Again, the analogy to more recently popularized forms of
mortgage financing is telling. Does the lender who takes only a oneyear or three-year note have a duty to extend it merely because the
property that secures it is sold? Does the lender who contracts for an
adjustable interest rate have a duty to refrain from adjusting it upward
because that action may make it more difficult for the borrower to sell
the property? If these lenders do not have the sorts of duties outlined,
as they quite obviously do not, why should a fixed-rate long-term
lender have any analogous duty? Viewed in this light, the notion that
the due-on-sale clause is a restraint on alienation does not withstand
analysis.
While we applaud the spirit of the Act, the implementation of its
objectives is quite another matter. In important ways the legislation is
clearly deficient. The principal problems arise with the window period
concept. Congress apparently wanted to protect, for at least a threeyear period, those borrowers who reasonably relied upon favorable
state law. This objective is praiseworthy, but the technique Congress
selected to accomplish it is fraught with pitfalls. To make legal rights
turn on when and how a state rule of law was adopted by a state court
ignores the vagaries and complexities of judicial lawmaking. Thb language of the Act itself foreshadows the problems when it refers to the
date "on which the next highest appellate court has rendered a decision
363
resulting in a final judgment if such decision applies State-wide."
The fallacy is obvious: judicial judgments "apply" only to the parties
before them and their privies; the reasoning that underlies them may
subsequently influence future decisions involving other parties, but the
process by which that occurs is subtle, complex, and often unpredictable. There is typically (and surely in the due-on-sale situation) much
room to explain, distinguish, reargue, and expand or contract the scope
of prior opinions. This is hardly a solid basis for establishing national
legislative policy.
The Bank Board has compounded the problem by failing to adopt
a consistent and rational interpretation of the window period concept.
It has sought simplicity where simplicity does not exist, and in doing so
it has almost certainly disregarded the intent of Congress. There is
363.

12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
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nothing inherently objectionable about a window period, or the benefits to borrowers that the window period concept makes possible. But
we believe Congress would have been far wiser to have simply enacted
a list of window period states and corresponding dates. If it had done
so, the great volume of litigation now anticipated could easily have
been avoided. The Act was drafted and passed in haste, 364 and perhaps
it is understandable that Congress was not able to reflect maturely on
these problems. Yet unless Congress moves to clarify the Act (and

there is no sign at this writing that it will), we can expect years of confusion and litigation.

364. On September 24, 1982, the Senate took the House version of the bill, H.R. 6267,
and deleted everything in it except for the title and the statement of intent, replaced the text
with S. 2879, and sent it back to joint conference. See generally 128 CONG. REC. S 12,221-63
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982). On September 30, Representative St. Germain won from the rules
committee a closed rule waiving certain procedural requirements--essentially those prohibiting consideration of the bill without debate. The text of the bill was distributed to the
House members on the morning of October 1, 1982. At approximately 9:30 p.m. on the last
night of the second session (October 1, 1982) the bill was put on the floor for a vote, despite
the fact that most of the members had not yet seen the legislation. Intense controversy
ensued: "[T]here is total disagreement as to what is in this bill. Very likely it perpetuates
high interest rates-but we don't know, because we don't know what is in this bill. We
ought to vote down this rule until we can take a good look at this legislation, none of us
knows what it does." 128 CONG. Ruc. H8429 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Perkins). Even one of the senior members of the banking committee-Representative Gonzalez-asked to postpone voting on the bill because he had not been able to study it. 128
CONG. REc. H8434-35 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).

